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Abstract
This paper examines the mechanisms, actors, enablers, and the institutional environment that
facilitate capital flight from South Africa and the resulting accumulation of private wealth in
offshore financial centers. We estimate that from 1970 to 2017, South Africa lost over $300 billion
through capital flight, including through overinvoicing of imports and underinvoicing of exports.
Net trade misinvoicing amounted to $146 billion over the 1998-2017 period alone. Export
underinvoicing appears to be especially rampant in the case of mineral resources such as gold,
silver, platinum and diamonds. While capital flight is not a new phenomenon in South Africa, it
has accelerated substantially over the past decades, a period marked by aggressive liberalization
of the national economy and rapid integration into the global economy. Capital flight is a concern
in a country such as South Africa that faces deep financing gaps, high multidimensional poverty,
inequality and unemployment. An important challenge faced by South Africa in its quest to tackle
capital flight and the associated problems such as tax evasion, base profit shifting, and money
laundering is the threat of erosion of the public confidence in state institutions in light of the
emerging phenomenon of state capture orchestrated by an intricate network of private ‘enablers’
with deep connections within the state and in the global economy. The adverse effects of capital
flight on economic development, state institutions and governance call for urgent attention to
prevent even more devastating consequences for the country’s political and social instability.

________
This paper is a product of a research project funded by a grant from the Open Society Foundation. Additional
support from Friedrich Ebert Stiftung is acknowledged. The project undertakes a detailed historical and institutional
investigation of the magnitudes, drivers, and enablers of capital flight from Angola, Côte d’Ivoire and South Africa,
as well as an analysis of the capital flight-governance nexus. The findings will be published in an edited volume as
well as country case study reports.

Preface to the Working Paper Series on Capital Flight from Africa
Capital flight constitutes a major constraint to Africa’s efforts to fill the large and growing
financing gaps that hold back its progress towards achieving sustainable development goals. The
mounting evidence on the unrecorded outflows of capital from Africa has spurred calls for
strategies to curb the financial hemorrhage that is afflicting the continent.
The existing evidence is still inadequate, however, on four fronts. First, the quantitative evidence
is predominantly aggregate and does not furnish adequate country-specific information on the
mechanisms of capital flight, its institutional contexts, and the role of domestic and foreign
players in facilitating it. Second, the literature has not paid adequate attention to the destinations
of wealth accumulated through capital flight and the roles of the banking sector and public
institutions in destination jurisdictions. Third, much of the literature conflates the capital flight
with the broader concept of illicit financial flows. While all capital flight is illicit owing to its
unrecorded transfer – and often, as well, by virtue of the illegal origins of the wealth, and the
failure to declare the assets and pay tax on the associated income – not all illicit financial
flows are capital flight; for example, payments for smuggled imports are an illicit flow but distinct
from capital flight. Fourth, the existing literature has not sufficiently explored the two-way
relationship between capital flight and governance in national and international institutions.
To help fill these gaps in the literature, the African Development Policy Program at the Political
Economy Research Institute has initiated detailed analyses in a project generously supported by
the Open Society Foundations and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation. This Working Paper series
presents the project’s outputs. Our goal in issuing these reports is to engender informed public
participation in decision making on financial regulation. Key findings will be distilled and
published in the coming year in an edited volume that is forthcoming from Oxford University
Press.
Léonce Ndikumana
Director, African Development Policy Program
University of Massachusetts Amherst
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1. Introduction
The second largest and most industrialized economy on the continent, South Africa is a middleincome country with vast natural resources, a developed financial system, a modern infrastructure
network, and a vibrant service sector, all of which are a cause of envy for other countries in the
continent. It has managed a peaceful transition from the oppressive apartheid regime, establishing
a modern pluralistic democracy, which is still elusive in many other African countries. At the same
time, however, the country is confronted by daunting economic, social and institutional challenges
that compromise not only the wellbeing of the majority of the population but also the country’s
political stability. South Africa has the unfortunate reputation of being ‘the most unequal country
in the world’ (Pomerantz, 2019).
Wealth and income are concentrated in the hands of a few, the middle class is thin and financially
insecure, and the majority of the population lives close to the poverty line. This is partly an
enduring legacy of the institutionalized racial inequalities of the apartheid regime which have
shown strong resilience to economic reforms undertaken in the post-1994 period under the ANC
governments. Poverty remains high, with nearly half of the population considered chronically
poor. Quality education continues to be inaccessible for a large fraction of the population,
especially in rural areas and low-income urban communities. Higher education remains elitist and
costly, out of reach for the youth from under-privileged communities. A major reason for the poor
welfare outcomes in the economy is ineffective utilization of natural resources as well as unequal
distribution of the gains from exploitation of those resources and of the benefits from economic
growth.
Alongside the unequal distribution of resources and incomes, the country faces steady hemorrhage
of wealth in the form of capital flight and other forms of illicit financial flows. While capital flight
is not a new phenomenon in South Africa, it has accelerated substantially over the past three
decades, a period marked by aggressive liberalization of the national economy and rapid
integration into the global economy. The threat of capital flight has always been on the minds of
South African policy makers. This was especially true during the apartheid regime, in light of both
the shortage of foreign capital inflows due to the international economic embargo and also the high
degree of country-specific investment risk that disincentivized holding domestic assets. Hence,
strict capital controls were seen as a means of keeping private capital in the country. In the postapartheid era, the policy stance turned toward liberalization in the name of both attracting capital
1

inflows and incentivizing domestic investment. The evidence presented in this paper suggests,
however, that this new policy stance has been ineffective. Rather than abating, capital flight has in
fact accelerated in the liberalization era. Meanwhile, special measures such as tax amnesties have
not yielded the expected results.
Capital flight is a major concern for several reasons. South Africa faces deep and structural
financing gaps and urgent development needs. By depleting the domestic savings and the tax base,
capital flight deprives the country of resources to undertake investments and public expenditures
that are required to meet development needs. From a policy perspective, evidence of capital flight
serves as an indictment against the policy and regulatory framework, in that it demonstrates the
failure both to incentivize domestic investment and to reign in illicit capital outflows. Capital flight
is also symptomatic of endemic institutional corrosion that facilitates illicit acquisition of wealth,
illicit cross-border transfers of foreign exchange, and the concealment of private assets in offshore
havens out of sight of the national authorities. In this respect, capital flight is closely connected to
the phenomenon of state capture, emerging from collusion between the political elite and domestic
and foreign private-sector interests driven by accumulation of private wealth.
The objective of this paper is to examine the mechanisms, actors, enablers, and institutional
environment that facilitate capital flight from South Africa and the resulting accumulation of
offshore wealth. The paper views capital flight as an institutional and development problem which,
if not tackled appropriately, carries risks to South Africa’s growth prospects but also its political
stability in the near future.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the magnitude, trends, and channels
of capital flight since the 1970s, as measured using the methodology described in detail in
(Ndikumana and Boyce, 2019). Sections 3 and 4 discuss the policy regimes regarding capital flows
under the apartheid regime and the post-apartheid liberalization reforms, respectively, and their
implications for capital flight. Section 5 focuses on the mining and energy sectors. This sets the
stage for the discussion of state capture in the section 6. Section 7 examines the motivation,
implementation and outcomes of tax amnesties and related measures that have been adopted by
the South African government in efforts to curb capital flight and entice repatriation of offshore
wealth as well as incentivize tax compliance. Section 8 reviews the consequences of capital flight
for development, stressing the urgency of the problem. Section 9 concludes with a summary and
policy recommendations.
2

2. Capital flight and hidden offshore wealth
Capital flight on the rise
Capital flight is a subject of both interest and controversy in South Africa. Interest in this issue
rests on the fact that it constitutes a drain on national resources in a country that, while considered
as the most advanced economy on the continent, remains stuck in a low-growth equilibrium1 and
faces daunting social and economic problems including high unemployment, multidimensional
poverty and deep inequality. Capital flight is seen as one of the causes of these problems and as a
serious handicap to strategies to address them.
The literature on capital flight exhibits substantial controversy, meanwhile, for two main reasons.
One is that because it is difficult to measure with precision, estimates are subject to contestation
by government officials, independent analysts, and, of course, those who have something to hide
such as politically exposed persons. The second reason is the tendency in the literature and the
media to conflate capital flight with other closely related but distinct phenomena, such as other
types of illicit financial flows, money laundering, grand corruption, and transfer pricing. The
confusion is especially pronounced in discussions of illicit financial flows. While capital flight
consists of cross-border capital flows that escape recording in official government statistics, the
scope of illicit financial flows is much wider. For example, payments for smuggling imports are
illicit financial flows, but they are distinct from capital flight because goods and services
(unrecorded in the official balance of payments) are received in return. Moreover, the universe of
illicit financial flows includes recorded as well as unrecorded capital flows. An example is money
laundering associated with criminal activities. Once illegally earned funds are integrated into the
formal financial system, they may be transferred in and out of the country through legal channels.
Because they are recorded in the official balance of payments, these transfers would not be
captured in measures of capital flight. Because of the range of activities covered by illicit financial
flows in this broader sense, and due to the inherent illicit and secretive nature of the transactions
involved, it is difficult to obtain an accurate measure of their overall magnitude.
The statistics presented in this section refer specifically to capital flight, measured as unrecorded
cross-border flows. A detailed description of the methodology of the estimation of capital flight,
1

From 1994 to 2018, per capita GDP grew by an average of 1.09% per annum. During the seven years leading to
global financial crisis (from 2000 to 2007), it grew at 2.5% annually. However, during 2011-2018, per capita grew
by a meager average of 0.16% per annum. These rates are calculated compound annual changes in GDP per capita at
constant 2010 prices from the SARB.
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the data, and the channels is presented in (Ndikumana and Boyce, 2019). Other estimates of capital
flight from South Africa can be found in earlier studies, including Ashman et al. (2011), Fedderke
and Liu (2002), Mohamed and Finnoff (2005), Ndikumana et al. (2015), Nicolaou-Manias and Wu
(2016), Rustomjee (1991), Smit and Mocke (1991), and Wood and Moll (1994).
The data show that capital fight has become a major problem in South Arica, accelerating from
the end of the apartheid era, even as the government embarked on a process of liberalization of its
policy regime and integration into the global economy. The next section discusses in detail the
history of exchange regulations since the 1960s and the movement towards liberalization since the
1990s as they relate to capital fight.
The baseline measure of capital flight is the Balance of Payments (BoP) residual, which is
calculated as the discrepancy between recorded foreign exchange inflows and recorded uses of
foreign exchange. The sources include export earnings (recorded in the current account) and
external borrowing and private capital inflows (recorded in the capital account). The uses include
payments for imports (in the current account) and recorded capital outflows, including debt
amortization (in the capital account). In principle, changes in the stock of official reserves should
correspond to the difference between inflows and outflows, yielding the ‘balance’ in the BoP. In
practice, there is often a residual, particularly when the BoP statistics on external borrowing are
replaced with more complete data from other official sources.2 In South Africa, as in most
developing countries, the residual often indicates that recorded inflows exceeded recorded
outflows. The ‘missing money’ – systematic discrepancies between sources and uses of foreign
exchange – is taken as a measure of capital flight.
In the case of South Africa, capital flight thus measured has increased dramatically since 1995, as
illustrated in Figure 1. This period witnessed rapid increase in foreign exchange inflows, mostly
through external borrowing and portfolio inflows. The case of external debt is discussed in detail
below. Total resource inflows increased from $34.8 billion over the 1995-99 period to $167 billion
over 2010-14. Between these two periods, total uses of resources increased from $22.7 billion to
$96.5 billion. The result was an increase in capital flight from $14.6 billion in 1995-99 to $75.8

2

The debt flow data recorded in the Balance of Payments often understate the extent of foreign borrowing. Hence,
these are replaced with the more accurate data provided by the World Banks’ International Debt Statistics (IDS), a
successor of Global Development Finance (GDF), itself successor of the World Debt Tables (WDT).
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billion in 2010-14. The corresponding cumulative amounts over 1995-2017 are: $441.1 billion for
sources, $261.5 billion for uses, and $179.6 for capital flight.

Figure 1: Capital flight from South Africa: 5-year total (billion, constant 2017 $)
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Trade misinvoicing
The methodology for estimating trade misinvoicing is described in detail in (Ndikumana and
Boyce, 2019).3 Import and export misinvoicing constitute a channel through which foreign
exchange inflows and outflows escape official recording in the BoP. Due to lack of suitable data
for calculating the extent of trade misinvoicing, the estimates presented here cover only the period
starting from 1998, when South African imports and exports are recorded in IMF’s electronic
Direction of Trade Statistics database. The latter source allows us to estimate the extent of
misinvoicing by comparing South Africa’s recorded imports and exports with the exports to South
Africa and imports from South Africa recorded by its trading partners (with adjustments for the
costs of freight and insurance). Adjustment of the residual measure of capital flight to include net
trade misinvoicing adds substantially to the amount to capital flight in almost every year, as
3

Also see Ndikumana and Boyce (2010) and Ndikumana et al. (2015).

5

illustrated in Figure 2. Over the 1998-2017 period, total net trade misinvoicing amounted to $146
billion. This is the net result of $79 billion in import underinvoicing (reflecting the use of foreign
exchange to pay for unrecorded imports) and $225 billion in export underinvoicing (reflecting
unrecorded sources of foreign exchange). Adding this to the unadjusted BoP residual yields total
capital flight of $306 billion during the 1998-2017 period.
These figures refer to aggregate trade summed across trading partners and products. Underlying
them, however, are misinvoicing in specific products and bilateral trade routes. The analysis of top
export products presented in Ndikumana and Boyce (2019) generally shows substantial
underinvoicing in exports of primary commodities.4
Figure 2: Capital flight adjusted for trade misinvoicing, 1998-2017 (billion, constant 2017 $)
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In South Africa as in other African countries, precious metals appear to be especially prone to
export misinvoicing. Ndikumana and Boyce (2019) present the cases of silver, platinum, gold over
the period 2000-2017. In the case of silver, the results show especially high discrepancies in trade

4

An exception is trade with countries that serve as trading hubs, such as the Netherlands and Switzerland, where the
results generally show apparent export overinvoicing, albeit to a lesser extent, so that the overall pattern remains
underinvoicing.
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with India, with export underinvoicing amounting to $78.7 billion. For platinum, exports to China
were underinvoiced by as much as $14.2 billion out of a total of $16.4 billion of imports from
South Africa.
For gold, the analysis is focused on non-monetary gold category, which is reported in Comtrade.
Non-monetary gold is gold that is not held as reserve assets (are referred to as monetary gold) by
the national authorities (the central bank). The results show particularly large differences between
the values of gold exports declared by South Africa and the value of gold imports reported by its
trading partners. Over the 2000-2017 period, while India recorded $47 billion in gold imports from
South Africa, the latter’s data show only $200 million of gold exports to the former. The United
Kingdom (UK) reported a total of $28 billion of gold imports from South Africa, while the latter
recorded only $300 million of gold exports to the UK. In the case of China, its records show $31
billion of gold imports from South Africa while the latter’s data show virtually no gold exports to
China.
It is not clear what is behind the large differences in gold trade statistics given that both trading
partners should, in principle, use the same classification codes to report gold imports and exports.
One possibility is transit trade, whereby gold that is recorded as imported from South Africa on
the partner’s side has transited through another country, which in South Africa’s books is recorded
as the importer. Another possibility is that gold purchased in South Africa is actually not South
African but rather was produced in another country and sold to South Africa. So, when the South
African trader sells the gold, they would not record it as South African exports while the trading
partners do record them as imports from South Africa.
These explanations would be inconsistent with the international conventions on the compilation
and reporting of trade statistics. First, if South Africa’s gold is sold to, say, an Indian buyer but it
transits in another country, India should be marked as the destination in South Africa’s records.
Second, gold that transits in South Africa should not be recorded as South African by the importers
and it would be recorded in South Africa’s data as ‘goods in transit’. Therefore, if both the
importers on one side, and South African exporters and government statistical services on the
other, follow the UN reporting conventions, their figures should be mutually consistent.
South Africa’s trade statistics exhibit another mystery: the majority of gold exports is recorded as
going to unspecified destinations – ‘other areas not elsewhere specified’. An equally problematic
feature is that starting in 2011, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) has merged non7

monetary gold and monetary gold. However, this practice would not explain the fact that South
Africa’s numbers are lower. If anything, the conflation of the two categories should produce the
opposite results: if South Africa combines the two categories of gold while its trading partners
separate them out, then South Africa’s figures should be larger, not smaller, than the non-monetary
gold imports recorded by its trading partners.
The authors of this paper have submitted requests to South African government agencies for
clarification of the reasons for these differences. At the time of writing, we have not received any
replies to these queries.

External debt and capital flight
The post-apartheid era witnessed both an explosion of capital flight and rapid acceleration of
external debt. Because of international sanctions, the apartheid regime could borrow relatively
little from abroad. External debt rose dramatically after the transition to democracy in 1994. The
statistics presented here are from the World Bank’s International Debt Statistics database. In 1994,
the external debt stock stood at $21.7 billion, corresponding to 15.5 percent of GDP. It rose to
$72.5 billion in 2007 (22.2 percent of GDP) and fell in 2008 during the global financial crisis. By
2018, the stock of debt had more than doubled, reaching $179 billion (48.8 percent of GDP). The
increase in debt was driven by both public debt and private non-guaranteed debt (Figure 3).
The increase in debt has led to a higher debt burden in the form of debt service payments, which
rose rapidly since 2008. In addition to the increase in the volume of new borrowing, the rapid
increase in debt service is also due to the rise in private credit at high interest rates. Cumulative
debt service over 1994-2018 amounted to $83 billion for general government plus $90 billion for
private non-guaranteed debt. The ratio of debt to exports rose steeply from 2008, following a
steady decline from 1996. A noteworthy fact is that the accumulation of external debt has been
translated into little gains in terms of net transfer of resources. For the general government, external
borrowing has resulted in a net transfer of resources to the lenders totaling $2.5 billion since the
end of the apartheid regime (Table 1). On a net basis, therefore, the South African government
financed the rest of the world rather than the other way around. For the private sector, external
borrowing brought in net resource inflows of $12.2 billion out of the $67.3 billion in new
borrowing (cumulative change in debt stock).
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Figure 3: External debt stock: Government and private sector (billion, current $)
160

140

120
60

63

100
58

80

55

54

52
49

52
60

48

40

20
5
10

4
10

2

11
3
10

7

11

13

9

18

33

29

75

25

55
34

8

52

54

53

70

56

40

5
5
19
13 13 15 14 14
11
8
8
8
7 11 12
0
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
External debt stocks, private nonguaranteed (PNG) (DOD, current US$)
External debt stocks, private guaranteed by public sector (PPG) (DOD, current US$)
External debt stocks, other publi c sector (PPG) (DOD, current US$)
External debt stocks, general gov ernment sector (PPG) (DOD, current US$)

Source: World Bank, International Debt Statistics.

Table 1: External debt, 1994-2018 (billion, constant 2018 $)
Debt
stock

Change
Net
in debt transfers
stock
69.7
-2.5
9.2
4.3
0.1
2.3

Debt
service

12.2
4.1
1.8

89.9
103.2
100.9

42.8

212.5

General government sector
69.5
Other public sector
7.5
Private guaranteed by public
0.0
sector
Private nonguaranteed
63.2
67.3
Public and publicly guaranteed
77.0
79.1
Public sector
77.0
79.0
Short-term
36.6
33.8
Total
179.3
181.9
Source: World Bank, International Debt Statistics.
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82.9
18.0
2.3

These statistics raise serious concerns about the sustainability of external borrowing as a means of
financing growth in South Africa. On the one hand, it is clear that the strategy is not bringing in
much by way of net resource inflows to finance development programs; more money is flowing
out of the country than is coming in, at least in the public sector. These are resources that are much
needed to finance social services and public infrastructure. Rather than increasing its reliance on
external borrowing, a better strategy for the South African government would be to expand its
domestic resource mobilization capacity, which would also help in preserving policy space and
government accountability. Doing so, however, would require coming to grips with the issue of
capital flight.

Accumulation of offshore wealth from capital flight
While capital flight is a loss to South Africa’s domestic economy, it is a benefit for the owners of
the associated assets and for the economies where those assets are held, many of which operate in
secrecy jurisdictions. Some of the funds that are illicitly transferred out of the country finance
consumption expenditures by their owners. But given that much capital flight is orchestrated by
economic and political elites, a substantial portion of the funds are saved and invested in various
financial instruments and offshore real estate. This money accumulates in value over time through
investment income and capital gains. The resulting wealth accumulation is difficult to estimate,
given that the composition of the portfolio is unknown and various assets have different rates of
return.
Several efforts have been made to estimate wealth held offshore as a result of capital flight. James
Henry has developed an estimate that is based on reasonable assumptions about the fraction of the
flight capital that is saved and the market rate of returns on assets held offshore (Henry, 2012,
2016). Under this approach, the most recent estimate of the stock of capital flight for South Africa
stands at $146 billion.5 Gabriel Zucman has estimated ‘hidden’ offshore wealth as the discrepancy
between a country’s recorded claims on wealth held offshore and its liabilities as recorded by

5

See the Global Haven Industry website: http://globalhavenindustry.com/africa-countries.
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offshore financial institutions, using data in the IMF’s International Investment Position (IIP)
(Zucman, 2013b).6
In our approach, we estimate the opportunity cost of cumulative capital flight by calculating its
stock, assuming that the all the money was saved and earned a modest rate of return equal to the
US 3-month Treasury bill. In a given year, the stock of capital flight or offshore wealth is
calculated as the capital flight in that year plus the stock of wealth in the previous year capitalized
at the Treasury bill rate. Under this approach, the stock of capital flight from South Africa
amounted to $297 billion as of end of 2017 (Figure 4). To put this figure in perspective, in that
year, South Africa’s stock of external debt was $180 billion. In this sense, South Africa could be
described as a ‘net creditor’ to the rest of the world.

Figure 4: Accumulated stock of capital flight (capitalized at the 3-month US T-Bill rate,
billion $)
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As an additional way to get a sense of the magnitude of capital flight, the cumulative stock of
capital flight thus measured is equivalent to 34% of the stock of private wealth held by South
African residents, which was estimated at $875 billion for 2017 by Credit Suisse’s Research
Institute (Credit Suisse, 2019). Incidentally, the 34% is quite close to the various estimates of
private wealth held abroad by Africans in general: Zucman (2013a, p. 53) estimates this at 30%,

6

See Ndikumana and Boyce (2019) for a discussion of Zucman’s methodology and its limitations for estimating
hidden offshore wealth for African countries.
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while Collier et al. (2001) earlier estimated it at 40%. In both estimates, the ratios for Africa are
much higher than for other regions. In other words, African private wealth holders exhibit a
negative home bias relative to High Net Worth Individuals (HNWI) in other regions, being more
inclined to prefer foreign assets over domestic assets.
The estimates of offshore wealth accumulated from capital flight are consistent with both the stock
of private wealth in South Africa and its skewed distribution in favor of the rich and ultra-rich.
Estimates of South Africa’s total private wealth vary, depending on the methodologies used, but
they tell a similar story in terms of trend of private wealth accumulation over time as well as the
country’s rank vis-à-vis other African countries. Private wealth and offshore wealth appear to have
grown in tandem, with the offshore proportion of the total private wealth in line with the 30-40%
share estimated for Africa by Zucman (2013b) and Collier et al. (2001).
According to AfrAsia Bank, in 2018, South Africa had the highest amount of private wealth among
African countries at $649 billion, accounting for 29.5 percent of the entire African continent’s total
private wealth ($2.2 trillion) (AfrAsia Bank, 2019). Egypt, ranked second, had less than half of
that amount ($303 billion) (Table 2).
The Credit Suisse Research Institute puts the stock of private wealth in South Africa a bit higher
at $787 billion in 2018, equivalent to 20% of its estimate of the continent’s total private wealth
($3.9 trillion) (Credit Suisse, 2019). The data show that private wealth has been rising faster than
national income: over the 2000-2019 period, private wealth per capita increased by 169% (from
$8,434 to $22,206) compared to 109% for GDP per capita (from $3,039 to $6,354) (Figure 5). The
faster increase in private wealth relative to national income is both a cause and effect of the
country’s widening economic inequality.
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Table 2: Private wealth and High Net Worth Individuals, 2018
Country

Stock of wealth in 2018
Amount
($bn)
649
303
225
114
93
69
43
2,200**
29.5%

Growth over
2008-2018

Number of
HNWIs*

Number of
billionaires

Per capita
($)
11,450
3,100
1,170
3,170
1,870
2310
1780
6571

South Africa
13%
39,200
5
Egypt
-10%
16,700
6
Nigeria
-4%
9,900
4
Morocco
5%
4,600
3
Kenya
64%
8,600
-Angola
25%
3,100
1
Côte d’Ivoire
37%
2,500
0
Total Africa
140,000
23
South
28.0%
21.7%
Africa’s
share
Source: AfrAsia Bank, Africa Wealth Report 2019.
Available online: https://www.afrasiabank.com/en/about/newsroom/africa-wealth-report-2019
*Note: HNWIs = High Net Worth Individuals (possessing $1 million or more in liquid assets)
**Note: of the $2,2 trillion of private wealth, $920 billion are held by HNWIs.
Figure 5: Wealth vs. GDP, 2000-2019 (current $)
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Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database (GDP); Credit Suisse (wealth).
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3.

Exchange controls and capital flight
The 1960s-1970s: The consolidation of exchange controls

The threat of capital flight has been a matter of concern for policymakers in South Africa for a
long time. This was especially a major preoccupation during the apartheid era in the context of
political instability that fueled fears of wealth moving overseas for safekeeping. The international
sanctions imposed on the apartheid regime created legal blockage as well as financial disincentives
for foreign capital inflows. This meant that the government had to utilize policies at its disposal to
try to ‘trap’ residents’ capital in the domestic economy. This made exchange controls and
regulation of capital flows important tools for government macroeconomic and financial policy.
Exchange controls limit the purchase and sale of foreign currencies in order to manage capital
flows, with the emphasis typically being on restricting capital outflows as well as short-term
speculative inflows. In South Africa, starting from the 1990s, they were also used to encourage
capital inflows, as we discuss below.7
The use of exchange controls in South Africa dates at least from 1939,8 when the country was a
member of the British Sterling Area. At that time, the United Kingdom asked member countries
to impose restrictions on capital flows outside of the Sterling Area, while facilitating free
movement of capital from the UK within the area.9 In South Africa, exchange controls were
tightened in 1961 in response to large outflows of capital following political unrest in the aftermath
of the Sharpeville massacre of 21 March 196010 and the country’s withdrawal from the British
Commonwealth.
The 1961 Exchange Control Regulations stated:
Except with permission granted by the Treasury, and in accordance with such conditions as the
Treasury may impose, no person other than an authorised dealer shall buy or borrow any foreign
7

See Stals (1998).
It can be argued that it began even earlier; see Scott and Pettersson (2019).
9
Stals (1998).
10
On 21 March 1960, under the leadership of the Pan-Africanist Congress (a splinter group of the African National
Congress, ANC) thousands of black South Africans gathered near a police station at Sharpeville (south of
Johannesburg) to demand the abolition of pass laws. The Police opened fire on the crowd, killing several dozen,
including women and children, and wounding hundreds more. A state of emergency was declared, thousands of
people were arrested, and the ANC and the PAC were outlawed. This incident heightened political instability in the
country and reinforced international pressure on the apartheid regime. In remembrance of the historical significance
of the massacre, President Nelson Mandela chose Sharpeville as the site for the formal signing the new constitution
on 10 December 1996 after the fall of the apartheid regime.
8
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currency or any gold from, or sell or lend any foreign currency or any gold, to any person not being
an authorised dealer.11

The Act also required explicit authorization by the Treasury to ‘take or send out of the Republic
any bank notes gold, securities or foreign currency, or transfer any securities from the Republic
elsewhere.’ It prohibited repatriation of the proceeds of sale of South African securities and profits
from investment in the country by non-residents. It further required that any sale of foreign
currency or any foreign asset by residents must be declared to the Treasury within thirty days.
Thereafter, exchange controls were extended over time in response to worsening domestic political
conditions and external political and economic pressure, including trade and investment sanctions
against the apartheid regime. In particular, the Soweto youth uprising of June 1976, when the state
police shot and killed innocent school children, including the now well-known Hector Pieterson
(twelve years old at the time), precipitated a profound change in the political landscape in the
country and energized both domestic and international opposition to the apartheid regime.
Exchange rate management was implemented through a parallel exchange rate system, known as
the ‘blocked rand’, which evolved via the ‘securities rand’ into the ‘financial rand’. Blocked rand
accounts were held by non-residents at commercial banks and could be used to deposit the
proceeds of sales of South African government securities, to purchase shares on the Johannesburg
Stock Exchange (JSE), and to purchase government, municipal and public utilities bonds. The
proceeds of these transactions could be repatriated after they had been held for five years (Farrell
and Todani, 2004).
In 1976, the ‘securities rand’ was introduced as part of efforts to attract foreign investment and
increase incentives for transactions on the JSE. This instrument allowed transfers among nonresidents as well as currency trading through brokers on the JSE. Three years later, the ‘financial
rand’ replaced the securities rand, upon the recommendation of the De Kock Commission’s
Interim Report published in June 1979. According to Gerhard de Kock, the Chair of the
Commission, who would later become the Governor of the Reserve Bank (1981-89), ‘exchange
controls were ‘fair weather’ arrangements which worked when required least’ (Farrell and Todani,
2004, p. 8).12 The Commission’s view was that the country should embark on a gradual process of
relaxing exchange controls and moving towards a market-determined exchange rate regime. This

11
12

South African National Treasury (1961, p. 2).
Also see Bhana (1985).

15

was expected to alleviate market distortions, increase net returns to investments, and ultimately
attract higher short-term as well as long-term foreign investments into the country while curbing
capital flight.

The 1980s: The crisis – things fall apart
Early moves towards liberalization were pursued throughout the 1980s, but policy reforms during
that decade were overshadowed by political and economic problems that plunged the economy
into a deeper crisis. In 1983, the government abolished the dual exchange rate and moved towards
phasing out all exchange controls on non-residents. This process culminated in the establishment
of a unitary exchange rate in 1983. However, the efficacy of these reforms was compromised by
the effects of political unrest, including the imposition draconian emergency measures by the
apartheid regime (e.g., the partial State of Emergency of 15 July 1985), and disappointed
expectations of change (e.g., the disastrous 15 August 1985 ‘Rubicon speech’ by President P. W.
Botha). Uncertainty and instability rocked foreign exchange markets and led to massive volatility
in capital flows. The situation was aggravated by debt distress, precipitated by the refusal of
American banks to roll over the country’s short-term debt. The South African government found
no other option but to impose repayment restrictions on foreign debt as it was running out of hard
currency. This exacerbated pressure on the rand, which depreciated at an average rate of 2% per
month from September 1983 to September 1986 (see Figure 6).
In 1989 the liberalization momentum picked up in with the appointment of Chris Stals as Governor
of the South African Reserve Bank (SARB), who was known for his strong commitment to marketoriented policy and the importance of protecting the value of the rand. The exchange rate became
the anchor of monetary policy, and the latter would become the central instrument of the
liberalization reforms from the 1990s until today.
Overall, the 1980s were a ‘lost decade’. The economy disintegrated due to domestic political and
economic instability. The phrase ‘things fall apart’13 would be an apt characterization of the state
of the country’s economic, social and political environment.

13

Things Fall Apart is the title of a well-known novel written by the legendary Nigerian author Chinua Achebe.
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Figure 6: Depreciation of the rand vis-a-vis the US$ in the 1980s
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1960s-1980s: Lessons learnt
Did the exchange controls of the 1960s-1980s work? Did they help to prevent capital outflows,
and to encourage foreign capital inflows and domestic investment? And most importantly, in the
context of this study, did they halt or reduce capital flight? In this case, the key constraints to
effectiveness of exchange controls were the structural economic and political problems that made
the controls necessary in the first place. The exchange controls proved incapable of alleviating the
effects of the deep political instability that engulfed the country and the devastating effects of
international economic embargo against the apartheid regime. These factors depressed domestic
investment, while at the same time they spurred capital outflows and discouraged capital inflows.
It is also possible that capital controls may not only fail to curb capital flight but instead exacerbate
it. In particular, poorly enforced capital controls may induce capital flight through trade
misinvoicing. When trade-exposed firms find it difficult or costly to access foreign exchange, they
may attempt to circumvent the controls by underinvoicing exports (to retain foreign exchange
abroad and avoid having to surrender it to the Central Bank at the official rate), and by
overinvoicing imports (to obtain foreign exchange from the Central Bank at the official rate). Some
studies have linked exchange controls to capital flight through trade misinvoicing in South Africa
17

in the 1970s and 1980s. Estimates of the amounts range from $12.4 billion by Smit and Mocke
(1991) to $20 billion by Kahn (1991) and $55 billion by Rustomjee (1991).14 Due to lack of
appropriate mirror trade data, we were not able to produce our own estimates of trade misinvoicing
during this period.
The failures of the exchange controls are further revealed by an examination of the financial gaps
that held back the country’s growth potential. The country confronted structural saving-investment
gaps and fiscal deficits that compromised capital accumulation and long-term growth. As can be
seen in Figure 7, these gaps had deepened in the 1970s in the context of global shocks (oil prices)
and political upheaval, especially following the Soweto youth massacre.

Figure 7: Resource gaps: Saving-investment gap and fiscal balance, 1960-1979
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Wood and Moll (1994) discuss limitations of these estimates of trade misinvoicing including statistical and
methodological issues.
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Figure 8: Secular decline in domestic saving and investment, 1960-2018 (% of GDP)
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But the adverse effects of political and macroeconomic instability on investment and saving in the
1980s ushered in a secular downward trend in domestic saving and capital accumulation that
continues to the present. As can be seen in Figure 8, the ratio of domestic investment and domestic
saving to GDP reached their peak around 1980 and then began to decline. Indeed, this trend has
been a major reason for the country’s inability to sustain high growth rates in the post-apartheid
era. While a pick-up of investment and saving sustained the growth acceleration from 2000 to
2007, the subsequent downturn in saving and investment coincides with growth deceleration.
Anemic growth has turned into a contraction of per capita income in recent years.15 Boosting
domestic capital accumulation and saving must be a central part of the strategy to boost growth
and combating capital flight must be part of this strategy.

15

Real per capita GDP declined from R56,549 in 2014 to $55,595 in 2018, shrinking every year except in 2017
where it virtually stagnated (growing at 0.028%). These figures are from the SARB database.
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It is clear that the control regime failed to boost domestic investment and saving. Did capital
controls help to attract foreign capital flows? During the 1970s, South Africa managed to attract
modest foreign capital, mainly in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI). But throughout the
1980s, the country experienced net outflows in most years (Figure 9). In cumulative terms, during
the decade of the 1970s, the country attracted a total FDI of $5.1 billion (in 2018 prices) but saw
an exit of $2.6 billion, resulting in net FDI inflows of $2.5 billion. In contrast, during the 1980s,
the country experienced cumulative net outflows of $4.7 billion, as only half a billion came into
the country compared to $5.1 billion that exited the country.
Figure 9: Foreign direct investment: inward, outward, and net flows, 1970-1989 (million,
constant 2018 $)
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Source: UNCTAD database.

The goal of attracting foreign capital in the form of portfolio investment, particularly through the
JSE, also never materialized. The government hoped that allowing non-residents to purchase South
African private equity and government bonds and to settle transactions via the ‘blocked rand
accounts’ would boost the JSE relative to foreign markets. This did not happen. Data on stock
transactions on the JSE, which are available on the SARB website starting from February 1988,
20

show net sales by non-residents in the final two years of the decade (Figure 10). Rather than serving
as a vehicle for bringing capital into the country, the stock market appears to have helped to
channel capital out of the country.
The restrictions on foreign exchange markets and accompanying capital controls pursued by
successive governments in the apartheid era were aimed at stemming capital outflows and fostering
domestic investment. As the foregoing analysis makes clear, these measures proved to be
unsuccessful in meeting both of these goals. The efficacy of these policies in other contexts
remains an open question. In the case of South Africa, however, they were implemented at a time
where the country was confronted by deep structural and political problems, at home and
internationally, that these policies could did not and could not address. The political instability
arising from domestic resistance against the apartheid regime and the international embargo
produced high levels of uncertainty that discouraged investment and created market instability. In
this sense, the policies failed because they merely addressed symptoms while ignoring the
underlying disease.

Figure 10: Net purchases of shares on JSE by non-residents in 1988-89 (Rand million)
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4.

Liberalization and capital flight in the post-apartheid era
Gradual liberalization

The post-apartheid era was characterized by further liberalization efforts, not only regarding
international transactions, but as a policy stance in multiple dimensions. The liberalization moves
were driven by three main factors pertaining to both the domestic economy and the global context.
First, the dominant school of economic thought in the 1990s held the view that exchange controls,
just like any other government interventions in the economy, were counter-productive in that they
created distortions and impeded the proper functioning of price mechanisms. One manifestation
of these distortions, in this view, is trade misinvoicing, an important mechanism of capital flight
(Kahn, 1991; Rustomjee, 1991; Smit and Mocke, 1991). More generally, it was believed that
distortions in the prices of goods and services, interest rates, asset prices, and production costs
resulted in misallocation of resources, preventing the economy from reaching its optimal level of
production; that is, output remains below capacity. There was substantial sympathy for this view
among South African policymakers, including at the Reserve Bank. This ideological view helped
to sustain the liberalization movement throughout the decade of the 1990s and continues to support
it even today.
Second, the decade was characterized by a concerted push by the Bretton Woods Institutions
(BWIs) for full market liberalization. Given its initially relatively low external debt at the
beginning of the 1990s, South Africa was less exposed than many other developing countries to
this pressure from the BWIs. But for the purpose of building relationships with international
institutions, there was high appetite for liberalization in policy circles.
The third factor was the removal of economic and political sanctions against the country with the
downfall of the apartheid regime. This meant that the county could abandon the old isolationist
regime and fully integrate into the global economy. It was expected that once wealth holders
overcame initial fears about possible instability and the risk of their capital being ‘trapped in the
country’ or even nationalized in a regime run by the previously disenfranchised black majority,
the domestic environment would become increasingly attractive to domestic as well as foreign
investors. Liberalization would help to assuage these fears and unleash a ‘democratic dividend’ in
the form of pent-up demand for private investment in the country.
This reasoning was questionable, however, in the context of considerable interest in
internationalization among major South African firms. Insofar as liberalizing exchange controls
22

was going to unleash private investment, it could turn out to be in investments abroad, with much
of these investments being of a financial rather than real nature. Ashman et al. (2011, p. 13) have
argued that ‘[s]ince 1994, major South African corporations have primarily pursued a strategy of
corporate globalization in the form of the increasing internationalization and financialization of
their operations.’ More specifically, conglomerates with intertwined activities in the mining,
industrial and financial sectors unbundled into entities with a core focus. An example was Gencor’s
spin-off of its non-precious metals mining assets and the creation of Billiton (Chabane et al, 2003,
p. 12). Billiton then would go on to internationalize by merging with the Australian mining firm
BHP. The mining giant Anglo-American focused its gold interests in AngloGold, sold South
African Breweries, pared its financial services interests to First Rand, and together with Billiton
bought out the minority shareholders in its chrome company, Samancor.16 For internationalization
to proceed, the regime of capital controls had to be relaxed. The allowance of dual listing of major
South African firms on the JSE and the London Stock Exchange (LSE), for instance, made possible
significant volumes of legal capital outflows that had been restricted under the previous regime. It
is not surprising that the liberalization of exchange controls enjoyed support from firms interested
in pursuing internationalized business strategies.
Arguments were also made against the liberalization of exchange controls. The main one was that
exchange controls would help to protect the economy against financial instability, including
instability originating from external factors.17 The 1998 Asian financial crisis bolstered support
for a more cautionary stance on liberalization. There was also apprehension regarding a possible
pent-up demand for capital outflows, following a long period of strict exchange controls.
The main debate, however, was not whether to liberalize or not, but about the appropriate speed
of liberalization. At one extreme were the supporters of a ‘big bang’ approach, who advocated
immediate lifting of all exchange controls. This view had prominent adherents in the private
financial sector. Others called for a gradualist approach, with a phased-out dismantling of the
controls. This position prevailed, as it was supported by the SARB, which guided the process of
reforms from the 1990s to the present (see reports on exchange arrangements by the IMF (various
years)).

16

Samancor recently has been alleged in court proceedings to have extracted as much as $500 million from 2005 to
2010 via practices such as transfer pricing and the pocketing of secret management and ‘facilitation’ fees. See van
Rensburg (2019).
17
See, among others, McKenzie and Pons-Vignon (2012) and Stals (1998). For a review of the evolution of views
on capital controls, see Klein et al. (2012).
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In 1993, several relaxations of the control regime were introduced, including the removal of
exchange controls on capital account transactions. In March 1995, the two-tier exchange rate
(‘financial rand’) system was terminated. This meant that non-residents were allowed to bring
capital to South Africa for any purpose and repatriate the principal and capital gains without any
restrictions. Resident corporations also were allowed – up to specified limits – to invest abroad
and raise capital abroad.
In June 1995, further reforms were introduced to allow resident institutional investors to diversify
some of their assets into foreign currency-denominated investments. In June 1997, the exchange
control regime enabled private individuals to make investments abroad up to specified limits. By
mid-1998, the Reserve Bank Governor confidently declared that ‘South Africa has reached a stage
where there are no effective exchange controls anymore on current account transactions and on
the movement of funds of non-residents… On balance, South Africa has now removed more than
seventy percent of all exchange controls of the past’ (Stals, 1998, p. 3).
Today the policy regime in South Africa is considered fairly open and liberalized, not only from a
historical perspective but also relative to many other countries.18 Standard measures of capital
account liberalization illustrate the relative openness in the post-apartheid era relative to the 1980s.
Relative to other large, middle-income economies, however, South Africa’s capital account regime
is regarded as being slightly more restrictive, as shown in Figure 11.

18

For current details on the currency and exchange control regime, see SARB (2019).
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Figure 11: Capital account openness index for selected middle-income countries, 1970-2018
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Source: The Chinn-Ito Financial Openness Index (KOPEN), http://web.pdx.edu/~ito/ChinnIto_website.htm.

Did liberalization help to attract capital inflows?
Among liberalization proponents, it was expected that removing controls on foreign exchange will
result in a net inflow of capital into the country. This would help to fill the savings-investment
gaps as well as alleviate foreign exchange shortages. By facilitating outward investment,
liberalization was also expected to facilitate portfolio diversification by residents. On the flip side,
relaxing exchange controls could also facilitate capital outflows, both recorded and illicit. The key
empirical question is which effect dominated in post-apartheid South Africa.
As discussed earlier, the 1980s witnessed net capital outflows despite the government’s attempts
to use exchange controls to prevent them. Data on FDI suggest that the country did not perform
better in the 1990s. On a net basis, the decade saw an outflow of $7 billion, with about $20 billion
of outward investment compared to $13 billion of inward investment (in constant 2018 US dollars).
As shown in Figure 12, things changed in the 2000s. In the first decade of the new century, South
Africa received massive inward investment to the tune of $51 billion, coupled with only modest
outward investment ($8 billion), resulting in a net inflow of $43 billion. These gains have not been
sustained, however, through the most recent decade, when inward and outward flows virtually
neutralized each other at about $41 billion in each direction.
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Figure 12: Foreign direct investment: cumulative inward, outward, and net inflows by
decade (billion, constant 2018 $)
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South Africa has had greater success in attracting other types of foreign capital apart from direct
investment in the post-apartheid liberalization period, portfolio flows in particular (Figure 13). Net
portfolio investment inflows reached $45 billion in the 1990s, eased to $34 billion in the 2000s,
and then skyrocketed to $109 billion from 2010 to 2018. The country also attracted other types of
private investments to the tune of $24 billion over 2000-09 and $42 billion during 2010-18.19
To what extent did liberalization help to alleviate foreign exchange shortages? The crisis-plagued
decade of the 1980s was marked by a depletion of foreign exchange reserves serious enough to
jeopardize the country’s ability to import. This occurred despite efforts by the government to
control access to foreign exchange and capital account transactions. The stock of reserves declined
to barely one month of import cover at the end of the decade (Figure 14). The country’s reserves
remained low around the transition period, but they began a steady increase from mid-1996. They
reached a peak in 2016, but they have resumed a downward trend thereafter, in the context of the
economic contraction that has characterized recent years. In this respect, then, liberalization can
claim some success.

19

‘Other investments’ reported in the balance of payments refer to equity and debt flows (assets and liabilities) that
are not recorded under foreign direct investment, portfolio investment, or financial derivatives and employee stock
options in the Financial Account of the Balance of Payments. See IMF (2009).
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Figure 13: Capital flows to South Africa (billion, constant 2018 $)
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Figure 14: Import-reserve cover, 1970-2018 (number of months)
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Did the liberalization of exchange controls incentivize equity investment into the national stock
market? It was expected that easing restrictions would encourage non-residents to bring funds into
the country, purchase domestic assets and repatriate the gains from their investments. The reforms
therefore were expected to give an edge to the JSE relative to foreign markets, including the LSE.
Looking at net purchases of shares on the JSE by non-residents, the market did attract net resources
during the seven years following the establishment of democracy, as well as in the four years
before the global crisis, with a short-lived rebound in 2009-10. In other years, however, the gains
were either minimal or there were net outflows (Figure 15). Since 2015, the stock market has seen
a substantial drain of resources from the country, posting negative net purchases each year. In this
respect, the benefits of liberalization appear to have been mixed, at best.
Figure 15: Net purchases of shares on JSE by non-residents, 1989-2018 (Rand million)
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Has liberalization helped to curb capital flight?
The anticipated benefits from the liberalization of exchange controls and the removal of capital
account restrictions included prevention of capital flight. One motive for capital flight is to secure
access to foreign exchange on favorable terms in a context where such access is restricted by law
or a shortage of hard currency. In such an environment, operators may seek to circumvent the
regulations to acquire foreign exchange and move it out of the country, without accurately
reporting the transactions to the regulatory authority.
28

In the case of South Africa, the period of dismantlement of exchange controls instead witnessed a
remarkable increase in capital flight, evident in both the leakages recorded in Balance of Payments
data and trade misinvoicing. Between 1990 and 1999, recorded foreign exchange inflows exceeded
the recorded uses of these resources to the tune of $22.2 billion. This corresponds to the simple
BoP residual measure of capital flight. In addition, $27.2 billion left the country through trade
misinvoicing, leading to a cumulative total capital flight of $49.4 billion during the decade. Matters
only got worse in the subsequent decades, with cumulative capital flight totaling $130 billion over
2000-09 and $158 billion over 2010-17 (Figure 16). The evidence that trade misinvoicing persisted
and even increased despite exchange rate liberalization suggests that the motives behind it have
not been simply to avoid surrendering foreign exchange earnings at a below-market official rate.
Figure 16: Capital flight in the post-apartheid era: total by decade (billion, constant 2017 $)
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Why did liberalization fail to discourage capital outflows? The South African government initiated
a series of market-oriented economic frameworks intended to stimulate investment and capital
inflows, and to reduce macroeconomic instability by stabilizing inflation. These reforms were
implemented with a view to boost growth while facilitating integration into the world economy.
This series of policy frameworks started with the 1996 Growth, Employment, and Redistribution
(GEAR) program, which among other things liberalized financial controls, slashed tariffs, and
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privatized ‘non-essential’ state enterprises.20 This was followed by the Accelerated and Shared
Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA) under President Thabo Mbeki in 2005, the New
Growth Path (NGP) under President Jacob Zuma in 2010, and the National Development Plan
(NDP) in 2013.21 Alongside these development plans, the government initiated specific measures
to entice the repatriation of private wealth held offshore, in the form of tax and capital flight
amnesty, to which we return below. The expectation was that these national development programs
would boost confidence in the economy and put the country on a path to rising economic
prosperity. The increasing capital outflows suggest that these plans have not been effective. In fact,
some have argued that aspects of the policies enacted under these plans encouraged rather than
discouraged capital flight. For example, (Marais, 2011, p. 114) maintains that the removal of
capital controls envisaged in GEAR amounted to ‘government-sanctioned capital flight.’
The positive gloss on capital outflows, or at least officially recorded outflows, is that South African
wealth owners have been able to take advantage of openness to diversify their portfolios. But these
gains arguably pale in relation the secular decline of domestic capital accumulation and its impact
on economic growth.
A plausible motive for the sustained capital outflows is tax evasion by private wealth holders and
traders, as well as profit shifting by South African and multinational corporations operating in the
country. South Africa is the top source of intra-African foreign direct investment, with its firms
dominating major sectors such as services (telecom and banking) and retail trade (grocery stores).
These investments elsewhere in Africa help companies to diversify their portfolios, taking
advantage of their comparative advantages in capital and technological endowments relative to
their counterparts in other countries, and tapping rising domestic demand in these countries. At the
continental level, these investments are an important driver of regional integration, a goal that has
gained prominence in the context of the African development agenda (e.g., African Continental
Free Trade Area, https://au.int/en/cfta). To the extent that these foreign investments are duly
recorded at both the source and destination, and that the appropriate taxes are paid on the profits
they generate, they can be considered normal and desirable correlates of economic prosperity,
regional integration and globalization. Problems arise, however, when these outflows are not duly
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For accounts of GEAR and related policies, see Weeks (1999), Taylor (2001), Streak (2004), and Marais (2011).
See “South Africa’s Key economic policies changes (1994 - 2013)”, retrieved from: South African Story Online
https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/south-africas-key-economic-policies-changes-1994-2013.
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recorded upon exit, and when they are channeled to offshore jurisdictions with opaque financial
and tax regimes, where the proceeds of the investments are hidden to evade taxation.
A further problem is trade misinvoicing, a major channel of capital flight that is poorly addressed
by reforms of exchange controls and openness of the capital account regime. While rigid
restrictions on access to foreign exchange and outward investment create incentives for export and
import misinvoicing, it does not necessarily follow that liberalizing exchange controls will get rid
of these practices. There are additional motives for trade misinvoicing other than access to foreign
exchange. One important motive is tax evasion. By understating the proceeds of their exports or
overstating value of imports, firms are able to understate their profits and reduce tax liabilities.
Such tax minimization strategies are especially pronounced among multinational corporations,
where trade takes place between units of the same global entity.
This problem is exacerbated by the opacity in global trade perpetuated by ‘trading hubs’ such as
Switzerland, the Netherlands, Hong Kong and Dubai. ‘Free ports play an important role in
anonymizing international trade analogous to that of anonymizers in the world of virtual
currencies,’ observes Ayogu (2019, p. 11). ‘They make the task of trade data reconciliation more
difficult, while increasing opportunities for trade-related capital flight.’ For example, the United
Arab Emirates (UAE) has emerged as the primary destination, or transit point, for precious metals
from Africa such as gold and diamonds. The analysis of mirror trade data on these precious metals
reveals very large discrepancies between the (lower) values declared by the exporting countries
and the (much higher) values reported in the UAE’s own trade statistics, suggesting systematic
export underinvoicing of mineral exports by African countries. A study by Reuters showed that,
based on importers’ statistics, the UAE was the top importer of gold from Africa in 2016 with
$15.1 billion worth, surpassing China ($8.5 billion) which earlier had been the leader, and followed
by Switzerland ($7.5 billion) (McNeill and Shabalala, 2019). Interestingly, Reuters’ investigators
were told by industrial mining firms in Africa, including AngloGold Ashanti, that they did not
send gold to the UAE. This would suggest that the gold is traded through informal channels. It also
suggests that gold exits without incurring any export duties, implying substantial revenue losses
for African governments.
Better (and better enforced) regulations could help to reduce trade misinvoicing. Perhaps the
biggest effects would come from improvements in the capacity to track, monitor and record trade
flows along the entire transaction chain from the source (exporter) to the ultimate destination (final
importer). The South African customs services have made efforts to modernize their electronic
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platform to improve the tracking of international trade. But in reality, the South African Revenue
Service (SARS) can effectively verify only a small fraction of total imports and exports. A
government official interviewed by the authors reported that SARS is able to inspect only about
three percent of all the containers moving through the country’s ports.22 This leaves ample
opportunity for manipulation of export and import quantities and values for the sake of minimizing
fiscal liabilities.
Finally, it is sometimes argued that persistent capital outflows are due to the shortage of skilled
labor in the country, forcing investors to set up shop abroad.23 This assertion was made by two
senior government officials who were interviewed by the authors.24 There is limited empirical
evidence to support this argument; at least none that the authors have come across that would
demonstrate the role that skills endowment plays in driving capital outflows. In any case, even if
a shortage of skills were an issue, this would matter for legitimate capital outflows that leave the
country for the sake of portfolio diversification and rate of return maximization. In the case of the
unrecorded outflows that comprise capital flight, the owners of the funds are likely to be more
interested in safe keeping and concealment of their wealth rather than chasing higher profit rates
abroad. The liberalization of international financial and trade transactions can do little to
discourage such outflows, and indeed may make them easier. Nor do policies aimed simply at
increasing the quality of labor skills or raising domestic rates of returns to investment.
It is clear, then, that the economic liberalization efforts undertaken over the years in South Africa
have not resolved the problem of capital flight. Stemming capital flight will instead require deeper
structural economic and institutional reforms aimed at encouraging and enforcing transparency in
cross-border trade and financial transactions. Before elaborating on strategies for combatting
capital flight in the concluding sections of this paper, we turn to a more in-depth examination of
two key sectors that are implicated in the phenomenon in South Africa: mining and energy.
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Interview on November 25, 2019 (anonymity requested).
See, among others, (Lewis, 2001, 2002). Gelb and Black (2004) find no robust empirical evidence for the view
that the shortage of skilled labor is a binding constraint to foreign investment.
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Interviews on November 25 and 26, 2019 (anonymity requested).
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5.

The mining industry and the energy sectors
The mining industry

The mining sector plays a major role in the South African economy. It has also been a scene of
financial scandals, struggles between capitalists and workers that have turned deadly (a prominent
example being the Marikana massacre of 16 August 2012), mismanagement of state-owned
enterprises, capital flight through export misinvoicing, and regulatory capture by industry.
South Africa’s rich underground resources and industrial capacity make it a leading producer of
key mineral products. Data from the US Department of Interior (2019) help to illustrate this point.
In 2015, the country’s share in global production stood at 74% for mined platinum, 59% for refined
platinum, and 46% for chromite. It produced 9% of the world’s refined gold, and 5% of mined
gold and diamonds. The mining industry contributes significantly to national income and foreign
exchange earnings, and somewhat less to employment. In 2015, it contributed 7.7% of GDP, the
largest contributions coming from coal (23% of the industry’s share in GDP) and platinum (22%).
Due to the sector’s high capital intensity, mining accounts for only 3% of total employment, with
about 480,000 workers in 2015. The mining industry is a major generator of foreign exchange,
accounting for 40% of the country’s total export value in 2015. The top export products are gold
and platinum with $4 billion in exports each in 2015, followed by coal with $3.6 billion and iron
ore with $2.6 billion. The performance of the mining industry is thus an important driver of overall
performance of the economy.
In 1968, the Director of the Economic Geology Research Unit at the University of Witwatersrand
observed: ‘It is held, by non-geologists essentially, that the acme of the mining industry [in
Southern Africa] will be experienced in the period between 1967 and 1972, and that, from the
latter years onwards, only a decline can be anticipated in mining’s contribution to the economy in
the [Southern African] sub-continent’ (Pretorius, 1968, pp. 0, Abstract). This prediction has been
only partially borne out. Overall, mining production and processing have maintained either upward
or steady trends for most products. Production of some mineral products, including chromite, coal,
iron and steel, increased over the past decade (Figure 17). Consistent with Pretorius’ forecast,
however, production of precious metals has been declining steadily over the past two decades
(Figure 18). From 2000 to 2015, gold production fell from 430 to 144 metric tons, a 66% decline.
In the same period, silver production declined by 64% from 144 to 52 metric tons. As nongeologists, we will not venture into predicting future the trend of mining production. Nonetheless,
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it is fair to say that the country needs to prepare for the unavoidable exhaustion of the reserves of
its key minerals in the coming decades. Replacing the resulting lost foreign exchange, tax revenue
and employment will be a serious challenge for South Africa, as it is for other natural resourceendowed countries.25
Figure 17: Production of coal, iron and steel, 1998-2015 (by weight)
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Source: US Geological Survey, 2015 Mineral Yearbook – South Africa (Advance Release),
September 2019.
Figure 18: Production of gold and silver, 1998-2015 (by weight)
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See, among others, Nishiuchi (2013) and Bornhorst et al. (2009) for a discussion on natural resource depletion and
domestic revenue and public investment.
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The industry is dominated by large private corporations, both domestic and international, including
global powerhouses such as Glencore (leader in chromite), Anglo American Platinum, and De
Beers (diamonds). The industry is highly concentrated with a few companies accounting for the
lion’s share in terms of capacity and production (see Table 3 and Figure 19). In diamonds, the top
three companies account for 96% of total capacity, with De Beers alone commanding about 70%.
The top three platinum mining companies account for 89% of capacity and 86% of production,
with Anglo American Platinum Ltd accounting for of 42% in capacity and 55% in production. A
similar picture emerges for gold, dominated by Sibanye Gold Ltd, Harmony Gold, and AngloGold
Ashanti Ltd26; iron ore and steel, dominated by Kumba Iron Ore Ltd; coal, dominated by Exxaro
Resources Ltd (25%) and Anglo Coal Ltd (23%); and chromite, dominated by Glencore.

Figure 19: Share of top three mining companies (capacity and production, % of total), 2015
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September 2019.
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In February 2020, AngloGold Ashanti sold its last South African mine, Mponeng, to Harmony Gold, “in a move
that could pave the way for the company to shift its primary listing from Johannesburg to London” (Hume, 2020, p.
1).
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Table 3: Share of top three companies in mining capacity and production, 2015 (% of total)

Product and Companies
Chromite
Glencore plc, 79.5%, and Merafe Resources Ltd., 20.5%
Samancor Chrome (Pty) Ltd. (International Mineral Resources
BV, 70%)
Tharisa Minerals (Pty) Ltd.
Top 3 companies
Coal
Exxaro Resources Ltd.
Anglo Coal Ltd.
Sasol Ltd.
Top 3 companies
Diamonds
De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd. (Anglo American plc, 85%)
Petra Diamonds Ltd.
DiamondCorp Ltd.
Top 3 companies
Gold
Sibanye Gold Ltd.
AngloGold Ashanti Ltd. (Anglo American plc, 41.8%)
Harmony Gold Mining Co. Ltd.
Top 3 companies
Iron ore, ferroalloys and steel
Kumba Iron Ore Ltd.
Assmang (Pty) Ltd.
Vanchem Vanadium Products Ltd. (subsidiary of Duferco
Group)
Top 3 companies
Platinum
Anglo American Platinum Ltd. (Amplats)
Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd.
Lonmin plc
Top 3 companies
Source: US Department of Interior (2019).
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Tax evasion and capital flight from the mining sector
As in other resource-rich countries, the mining sector in South Africa is vulnerable to capital flight
through various mechanisms, including misinvoicing of mineral exports, as well as profit shifting
for tax evasion through aggressive transfer pricing (Antin, 2013; Ashman et al., 2011). As
discussed in section 2, there is evidence of substantial trade misinvoicing in South Africa’s mineral
sector, with large and systematic discrepancies between the (smaller) value of exports declared by
South Africa and the (larger) value of imports reported by its trading partners.27 Similarly, in the
case of diamonds we find that between 2010 and 2018, South Africa declared $17 billion worth of
exports, while its trading partners reported $51 billion worth of imports. The discrepancy is
particularly notable in the case of China, the top importer: China reported $22.8 billion of diamond
imports, whereas South Africa reported only $13.5 million over this period.28
A glimpse of the mechanisms by which capital flight from the mining sector may occur was
provided in a October 2019 complaint filed by the Association of Mineworkers and Construction
Union (AMCU) in the Johannesburg High Court against Samancor Chrome, the world’s second
biggest chrome producer. The complaint alleged that the company had illicitly transferred funds
offshore through transfer pricing, secret management and facilitation fees, and secret asset selloffs (Hosken, 2019). Citing an affidavit from a former Samancor director who had turned
whistleblower, the AMCU alleged that the company had siphoned funds at the expense of minority
shareholders to benefit the directors of a company called Kermas Limited, registered in the British
Virgin Islands (Faku, 2019).29 AMCU president Joseph Mathunjwa explained that the diversions
came to the union’s attention when it noticed “suspiciously low returns” on the workers’ employee
share ownership plan (Malope, 2019). When a Samancor’s subsidiary was sold in 2007 to the
Chinese state-owned conglomerate Sinosteel for $225 million, in one instance cited in the
complaint, “Kermas received $125 million from Sinosteel directly” via a transfer into London bank
account according to the affidavit submitted by former Samancor director Miodrag Kon.30 In
another alleged instance, Samancor entered into a contract for chrome and platinum reprocessing
with an Australian company on what the AMCU affidavit characterized as “generous” terms, with
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See also Ndikumana and Boyce (2019).
Computed using data from Comtrade, the Commodity Trade Statistics database of the United Nations.
29
A Samancor spokesperson responded that the allegations were “malicious and opportunistic” (Faku 2019).
30
Miodrag Kon, Supporting Affidavit submitted to the High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division,
Johannesburg) in the Matter Between Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union, Applicant, and
Samancor Chrome Limited, First Respondent, p. 27, available at
https://cdn.24.co.za/files/Cms/General/d/9427/ef3cd3230b9a40c9962b3ca1286e1467.pdf (accessed June 8, 2020).
See also van Rensburg (2019).
28
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a commission in the form corporate shares being transferred to another British Virgin Islands entity
that served as “a front for some of Samancor’s directors and shareholders at the time.”31
Lonmin Plc, the London-based platinum producer, is similarly alleged to have engaged in profit
shifting to the detriment of mineworkers and minority shareholders.32 The Marikana Commission
of Inquiry, an official body appointed by South African President Jacob Zuma to investigate the
massacre of 44 striking workers at a Lonmin mine on August 16, 2012, 33 reported that over the
2007-2011 period, during which Lonmin claimed that its platinum mining operations in South
Africa could not afford to meet housing obligations to workers that were budgeted at R665 million
(about $85 million), the firm “paid more than R1.3 billion in ‘marketing commission’ payments”
to its management services branch “and/or its Bermudan registered subsidiary.”34 In an analysis of
the firm’s accounts, economist Dick Forslund concluded that “terminating the Bermuda profit
shifting arrangement” and cutting back on management fees to “a reasonable amount” would have
enabled Lonmin to meet the wage demands that were one of the main issues in the August 2012
strike (Forslund, 2015a, p. 9).
Forslund argues that aggressive transfer pricing by multinational mining firms enables not only
tax avoidance, but also “wage avoidance” and “dividend avoidance in relation to investors holding
shares in subsidiaries,” as profits are “effectively moved from the stakeholder table” in South
Africa.35 Such practices help to explain why the benefits of mineral resource extraction in South
Africa often have accrued disproportionately to their majority and foreign shareholders at the
expense of mineworkers, minority and domestic shareholders, and the domestic economy as a
whole.
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Jeffrey Khehla Mphahlele, General Secretary of the Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union,
Founding Affidavit submitted to the High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg) in the Matter
Between Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union, Applicant, and Samancor Chrome Limited, First
Respondent, and others, p. 7, available at
https://cdn.24.co.za/files/Cms/General/d/9427/edab4be2f0c74afaa96afd12ee3f62c5.pdf (accessed June 8, 2020). See
also Supporting Affidavit submitted by Miodrag Kon (supra note 30), pp. 15-24, and Malope (2019).
32
Lonmin Plc is a British holding company (at 80%) with two South African operating subsidiaries, Western
Platinum Limited and Eastern Platinum Limited (Forslund, 2015a).
33
According to the Commission, the mineworker uprising at the Lonmin Mine in Marikana, in the North West
Province in August 2012 “led to the deaths of approximately 44 people, more than 70 persons being injured,
approximately 250 people being arrested”(https://www.justice.gov.za/comm-mrk/). Appointed by President Jacob
Zuma on 23 August 2012, the Commission was chaired by Honourable Judge Ian Gordon Farlam, a retired judge of
the Supreme Court of Appeal, and included Advocate Bantubonke Regent Tokota and Advocate Pingla Devi Hemraj
as members. The Commission’s report was issued on July 10, 2015 (Government Gazette No. 38978) (Marikana
Commission of Inquiry, 2015).
34
Marikana Commission of Inquiry (2015), p. 538. See also(Bond, 2019; Forslund, 2015a, 2015b) and Bond (2019).
35
(Forslund, 2015a, 2015b). pp. 10, 35. See also (Forslund, 2015a, 2015b).
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The energy sector and the dominant role of state-owned enterprises
In the energy sector, South Africa’s influential state-owned companies are involved at various
stages of the production and distribution chain. A dominant player is Eskom, which generates 95%
of the country’s electricity. It is a public utility established in 1923 as the Electricity Supply
Commission (ESCOM) by consolidating several electricity generation companies into a single
entity.36 The company was created with a clear mission, articulated in its first annual report, dated
9 August 1924: ‘The Commission regards cheap power as an important factor in promoting
industrial development and has, therefore, devoted, and will continue to devote, the closest
attention to this aspect of its duties and responsibilities under the Electricity Act.’37
This mission was reaffirmed in the post-apartheid era, when the company embarked on a massive
plan to connect hitherto excluded townships and rural communities to the grid. In 1995 alone, the
company connected more than 300,000 households. The company was widely regarded as a source
of national pride, and in the words of former chairman John Maree, it was ‘admired internationally’
and was ‘a pillar’ for the country’s economic growth.38 Today, as discussed below, the giant
company is marred by financial distress, high operating costs, and mismanagement scandals.
Eskom remains the nation’s primary supplier of electricity. It manages generation, transmission,
and distribution to industry, commercial, and residential customers in South Africa as well as in
the wider Southern African Development Community (SADC) region. It is a wholly state-owned
enterprise, with the Department of Public Enterprise as the shareholder representative. Recently,
Eskom has faced financial troubles due to declining sales arising from deteriorating technical
performance at its coal-fueled power plants, declining cross-border sales, high operating costs
attributable, among other things, to an inflated wage bill, and unpaid bills owed by delinquent
clients, especially local municipalities. Many of these problems are symptomatic of poor
governance, planning and management. The Office of the Public Protector, an autonomous state
institution established by the South African Constitution whose responsibilities include
enforcement of good governance in the public sector, concluded in a 2016 report that “it appears
that the Board at Eskom was not properly appointed” and noted instances in which it appears that
“the Eskom Board did not exercise a duty of care,” possibly in violation of South Africa’s Public
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ESCOM was also known by its Afrikaans name Elektrisiteitsvoorsieningskommissie (EVKOM) under the terms
of the Electricity Act of 1922. The name was officially changed to Eskom in 1987.
37
Pieter du Toit, “1922 - 2019: The rise and fall of Eskom”, Fin24, 13 February 2019.
https://m.fin24.com/Economy/1922-2019-the-rise-and-fall-of-eskom-20190213.
38
du Toit (2019)
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Finance Management Act.39 In the public mind, the name Eskom is now associated with ‘loadshedding’ – scheduled periods of rolling blackouts – which has become a major hindrance to
economic activity and a disruption to the quality of life for households, and a cause of
embarrassment for the government.
Eskom’s poor financial performance has forced it to resort to borrowing to cover its costs. Raising
electricity tariffs alone proved to be insufficient to cover costs, while at the same time being
politically costly for both the company and the government. As a result, the company’s debt has
skyrocketed from R106 billion in 2010 to R389 billion in 2018, and was forecast to exceed R440
billion in 2019 (Figure 20). Most of the borrowing is domestic in the form of company bonds, and
loans from development finance institutions. But the company is also exposed significantly to
foreign debt (Figure 21).

Figure 20: Eskom's gross debt (Rand billion)
500

441

450
389

400
355

350

323
297

300
255

250
203

200

183
160

150
100

106
74

50
0
2007

2009

2011

2013

2015

2017

2019
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Office of the Public Protector (2016, pp. 347-349).
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Figure 21: Eskom debt securities and borrowings, 2018 (Rand million)
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The financial difficulties faced by Eskom are a matter of concern for the South African government
for several reasons. First, Eskom is not alone; its financial problems are symptomatic of systemic
challenges faced by the parastatal sector more generally. Other enterprises, such as the rail, port,
and pipeline company Transnet (whose majority stockholder is the South African government’s
Department of Public enterprises) and South African Airways (wholly owned by the government)
are now in similar financial quagmires. Second, the financial difficulties have serious political
costs for the government. Just as Eskom was a cause of pride in the days where it worked to ‘light
up’ the townships and the rural areas, it is now seen as a dark spot on the government’s capacity
to deliver essential public services and an indictment of poor governance. Third, Eskom’s financial
problems exacerbate the financial burden on a government that is itself facing rapidly rising debt.
Over the past decade, according to SARB data, foreign debt rose from $111.2 billion in 2010 to
$172.4 billion in 2018, a 55% increase, while domestic debt increased from R863.9 billion ($117.9
billion) to R2.4 trillion ($186.9 billion), a 186% increase.40
Today, Eskom is at the point where it cannot even cover its interest on debt, as the firm finds itself
unable to raise revenues or cut costs significantly. In the past, it has benefited from steep increases
in tariffs. But this strategy has reached its limits as it risks undermining the company’s statutory
mission by throwing customers off the grid, in addition to ramping up the amount of unpaid bills,
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The equivalent increase in the debt stock in dollar terms is 58.5%. During this period the rand depreciated from
R7.23/$ to R13.23/$.

41

especially from local municipalities, and threatening the country’s already weak industrial sector
performance.
Eskom’s financial challenges have been exacerbated by its poor management record. Governance
and regulatory compliance, especially with regard to procurement, are the major focus of the
current government’s efforts to rescue the company. These efforts include financial support, cost
curtailment measures, increases in electricity tariffs, and partition of Eskom into separate entities
for generation, transmission and distribution.41 But the most critical issue that must be tackled is
mismanagement. The Director’s Report contained in Eskom’s March 2019 Annual Financial
Statement recognizes the problem clearly: “The initial focus of the board appointed in January
2018 was to root out financial mismanagement, malfeasance and maladministration, the
elimination of which is critical to restore transparent and effective governance. The ongoing
internal and external enquiries and investigations into state capture also negatively impacted
Eskom’s reputation.”42
Eskom has featured prominently in allegations of illicit actions by government officials and private
operators. The most prominent among these are members of the Gupta family along with
international consulting and auditing firms, as discussed in the next section.
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Plans to split up the company have been proposed since the 1990s, but they have always faced determined
opposition from labor unions concerned about job losses and the risk that partition may be a path to privatization.
42
Eskom, Annual Financial Statement, March 31, 2019, p. 3. Available at
http://www.eskom.co.za/IR2019/Pages/default.aspx (accessed June 10, 2020).
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6.

State capture and enablers: The Gupta case

Capital flight from South Africa is a symptom of deeper structural and governance problems that
enable private appropriation of public resources and undermine the efficacy of government
regulations and mechanisms to enforce transparency in trade and financial transactions. This
situation often involves collusion between agents inside the government and actors in the private
sector.
Photograph 1

Jacob Zuma, president of South Africa, and Atul Gupta, one of the Gupta brothers, at an event in 2012. © Flickr.
Source: Financial Times, March 8, 2016. https://www.ft.com/content/abd6e034-e519-11e5-a09b-1f8b0d268c39

This section illustrates how these elements come together in the mining and the energy sectors. In
recent years, the nation has been rocked by a story of corruption and capital flight that has
embroiled a former South African president, other prominent members of the political elite, the
private sector, and international financial networks. The scandal has been the focus of a special
investigation by the South African government’s Office of the Public Protector and extensive
reporting by teams of investigative journalists.43
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This section relies heavily on the Office of the Public Protector’s report titled State of Capture, released in
October 2016. The Office of the Public Protector undertook extensive investigation into the allegations of improper
conduct by President Zuma and other state functionaries and the involvement of the Gupta family. The investigators
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The story centers on the Gupta family, in particular the three brothers, Ajay, Atul and Rajesh (a.k.a.
Tony), and their business associate Salim Essa. From humble beginnings in India, the Gupta
brothers migrated to South Africa just as apartheid was coming to an end, and rose to eventually
become one of the richest and most politically well-connected families in South Africa. They
would eventually leave the country, going into “self-imposed exile” with the fall of the Zuma
government in 2018 (Onishi and Gebrekidan, 2018). The Gupta brothers built their fortune by
forging connections with key figures in the government, the ruling African National Congress
(ANC), and major parastatal companies. They developed strong bonds with the government led
by Thabo Mbeki, where Mbeki’s successor, Jacob Zuma, has stated that Ajay Gupta served on the
president’s economic advisory council.44 The New York Times reported that on Mbeki’s
resignation, the brothers skillfully navigated the political transition, forging even closer ties with
the Zuma regime (Onishi and Gebrekidan, 2018).
The family’s business interests in South Africa began in the computer equipment and IT sector,
and eventually expanded into other parts of the economy from mining and energy to mass media.
The initial ventures that launched them in the business world were Sahara Computers and Sahara
Systems. Their brand was made visible in 2004 when they acquired the naming rights for three of
South Africa’ best-known cricket stadiums for a five-year period: Newlands in Cape Town became
Sahara Park Newlands; Kingsmead in Durban became Sahara Stadium Kingsmead; and St
George’s Park in Port Elizabeth became Sahara Oval St Georges. Their ventures in media included
The New Age newspaper and ANN7 TV. Oakbay Investments became their core parent company.
Oakbay’s holdings included Tegeta Exploration & Resources, a mining company in which Oakbay
was the leading shareholder with a 29.05% ownership stake (Office of the Public Protector South
Africa, 2016, p. 112). The second shareholder of Tegeta was Mabengela Investment (28.53%),
which in turn was owned by President Zuma’s son Mr. Duduzane Zuma (45%), Rajesh Gupta
(25%) and others (Office of the Public Protector South Africa, 2016, p. 112). Tegeta’s third biggest

documents relating to the Gupta scandals to amaBhungane and Daily Maverick, on which the #GuptaLeaks reports
are based (Davis, 2018). See ‘#GuptaLeaks: A collaborative investigation into state capture,” https://www.guptaleaks.com/, accessed 30 April 2020. The Guptas have denied that the emails released by #GuptaLeaks are authentic
(Montiero, 2017).
44

See Myburgh (2017, ch. 3). The Thabo Mbeki Foundation has denied that Gupta served as an economic adviser to
the president; see “Statement of the Thabo Mbeki Foundation regarding allegations of a link between President
Mbeki and the Gupta Family,” April 11, 2016. Available at https://www.mbeki.org/2019/09/10/statement-of-thethabo-mbeki-foundation-regarding-allegations-of-a-link-between-president-mbeki-and-the-gupta-family/ (accessed
11 June 2020). Thabo M. Mbeki served as Deputy President under Nelson R. Mandela from 1994 until 1999, when
he became President. He was recalled from his position by the ANC’s executive committee in 2008, and was
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shareholder (21.5%) was a firm called Elgasolve, whose sole director was Salim Essa, a close
associate of the Guptas (ibid.).
As reported in The New York Times, the Guptas made deep connections in South Africa’s ruling
party, the ANC, which were solidified in the early 2000s through government contracts, including
one to set up computer laboratories in schools in Gauteng province, which includes Johannesburg
and Pretoria (Onishi and Gebrekidan, 2018). Over time, the family became especially closely
associated with former President Jacob Zuma. One of Zuma’s sons, Duduzane Zuma, worked
closely with the Gupta companies and had holdings in several of their ventures, including ANN7,
according to the Financial Times, as well as Tegeta Exploration & Resources (England, 2016).45
In October 2016, the South Africa government’s Office of the Public Protector released a
comprehensive report, State of Capture, examining the alleged linkages between former President
Zuma, state-owned enterprises, and Gupta family businesses (Office of the Public Protector South
Africa, 2016). The investigation pursued what the report called “complaints of alleged improper
and unethical conduct by the president and other state functionaries relating to alleged improper
relationships and involvement of the Gupta family in the removal and appointment of ministers
and directors of State Owned Entities (SOEs) resulting in improper and possibly corrupt award of
state contracts and benefits to the Gupta family’s businesses” (Office of the Public Protector South
Africa 2016, p. 4).
Ongoing investigations and legal processes are led by the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into
Allegations of State Capture (also known as the Zondo Commission after its chairman, Deputy
Chief Justice Raymond Mnyamezeli Mlungisi ‘Ray’ Zondo).46 The Commission was established
in 2018 by President Cyril Ramaphosa to investigate allegations of state capture, corruption and
fraud in the public sector and organs of the state. In July 2018, Duduzane Zuma was charged by
the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) with corruption over his alleged involvement with an
attempt by one the Gupta brothers to bribe Mcebisi Jonas in 2015 while the latter served as Deputy
Minister of Finance, and he has since testified before the State Capture Commission (Cotterill,
2018a; Office of the Public Protector South Africa, 2016). In a setback for the prosecution,
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however, the charges were “provisionally” withdrawn in January 2019 pending further evidence
(Reuters, 2019).
The Gupta family’s influence in South Africa’s economy and the political system was a result of
what Professor Njabulo Ndebele, Chancellor of the University of Johannesburg and Chairman of
the Nelson Mandela Foundation, has characterized as a “systemic approach” involving three main
prongs: first, assisting Jacob Zuma to consolidate power, involvement in nominations and
dismissals of officials in government positions and in state-owned enterprises, and building ties
with provincial-level politicians; second, securing business contracts in key sectors from major
state-owned enterprises, such as Eskom and Transnet; and third, “lining up” the justice system
(policy, intelligence, NPA) in support of the Gupta-Zuma partnership (Ndebele, 2016). Here we
focus on the family’s activities in the mining and the energy sectors.

Opaque deals
The Guptas invested heavily in the mining sector, including coal mining, and had extensive
dealings with the public energy companies, especially Eskom. In addition to Tegeta Exploration
and Resources (which owns Optimum Coal Mine), the subsidiaries of Oakbay Investments include
Oakbay Resources and Energy, involved in uranium and gold mining and processing, the Shiva
Uranium mine, and five other firms. In August 2019, all were under ‘business rescue,’ a legal
process intended to rehabilitate a financially distressed company by placing it under temporary
supervision of a court-appointed business rescue practitioner while suspending payments to
creditors during restructuring (South AFrican Gauteng Division High Court, 2019).47
The Optimum Coal Mine and Eskom
The role of the Gupta family’s political connections in facilitating the growth of their business
interests was illustrated by their purchase Optimum Coal Mine (OCM) from the international
mining giant Glencore. This mine is of strategic interest, since it supplies Eskom’s ten-unit
Hendrina power station. In July 2015, OCM’s parent entity, Optimum Coal Holdings (OCH), then
owned by Glencore, filed to be placed in business rescue (Office of the Public Protector South
Africa, 2016, p. 268) (Office of the Public Protector, 2016, p. 268.48 The move came after Eskom’s
Chief Executive at the time, Brian Molefe, and the Eskom Chair refused to renegotiate the price
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of a long-term supply contract with Glencore, putting financial pressure on the firm (Office of the
Public Protector South Africa, 2016, p. 145).49 Also in July, Eskom demanded that Optimum pay
a R2.17 billion penalty for allegedly having supplied substandard coal (ibid, p. 251).
That same month, Glencore “received a letter from KPMG Services (Pty) Ltd,” conveying an offer
from a client who wished to “remain anonymous,” offering to purchase OCM or its parent entity
for R2 billion (Office of the Public Protector, 2016, p. 147). The prospective suitors, the Office of
Public Protector concluded, were “the only entities/individuals which stood to benefit from
OCM/OCH not being awarded a revised contract by Eskom… who could now purchase an entity
in business rescue” (Office of the Public Protector South Africa, 2016, p. 251). The anonymous
client turned out to be the Gupta company, Oakbay, lead shareholder of the mining company
Tegeta whose second shareholder was the President’s son Duduzane Zuma (Office of the Public
Protector South Africa, 2016, p. 251).
Eskom CEO Brian Molefe had close ties to the Guptas, with Ajay Gupta calling him “a very good
friend” (Office of the Public Protector, 2016, p. 86). Records show numerous phone calls between
the two at the time when the disputes between Eskom and Glencore were ongoing (Office of the
Public Protector South Africa, 2016, pp. 122-123).50 The Eskom executives reportedly pressed
Mining Minister Ngoako Ramatlhodi to suspend Glencore’s mining license (Sole and Comrie,
2017). The firm’s license was temporarily suspended, but Ramatlhodi pushed back and quickly
managed to reinstate it (Sole and Comrie, 2017). In September 2015, President Zuma fired
Ramatlhodi, replacing him with Mosebenzi Zwane, a politician reportedly connected with the
Guptas through the Estina dairy project scandal, described below (Sole and Comrie, 2017).51
In December 2015, President Zuma fired the Finance Minister, Nhlanhla Nene, and replaced him
with little-known Des van Rooyen (Office of the Public Protector, 2016, p. 87(Sole and Comrie,
2017).52 Historically, the Treasury has been one of the strongest pillars of South Africa’s state
institutions, with an important oversight role. The unexpected appointment of a new Finance
Minister with little experience met strong pushback from financial markets, local business leaders,
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and some within the ruling party. A few days later, the well-respected Pravin Gordhan, former
Minister of Finance, was reinstated to restore economic stability (ibid.). Gordhan arrived too late,
however, to intervene in the OCM case: shortly before he took office, it was announced that Tegeta
had purchased the firm. 53
The events surrounding the purchase of OCM have raised questions as to the motives of Eskom
executives. OCM had a long-term ‘fixed-price’ contract with Eskom for coal that by 2013 started
to become unaffordable for the mine to meet. Was Eskom’s refusal to sign a new price agreement
with Glencore to supply coal to ‘at cost’ intended to force OCM into financial distress and reduce
its potential sale price? “Glencore appears to have been severely prejudiced by Eskom’s actions in
refusing to sign a new agreement with them for the supply of coal,” the Office of the Public
Protector (2016, p. 352) concluded. “It appears,” the report continued, “that the conduct of Eskom
was solely to the benefit of Tegeta” (ibid.).
“Further evidence of the apparent prejudice caused by Eskom,” the Office of the Public Protector
(2016, p. 341) observed, “is that once the sale agreement was signed in December 2015, Tegeta
appears to have easily managed to secure lucrative contracts to supply coal to the Arnot power
station with coal from OCM.” In January 2016, Eskom awarded Tegeta the first of several coal
supply agreement (CSAs) (Office of the Public Protector South Africa, 2016, p. 20).
After an extensive financial analysis, the Office of the Public Protector concluded that a CSA
prepayment to Tegeta in the amount of R659 million, ostensibly to service the Arnot contract,
“appears to have been used by Tegeta solely to fund the purchase of OCH [Optimum Coal
Holdings]” (Office of the Public Protector South Africa, 2016, p. 20). The prepayment “possibly
amounts to fruitless and wasteful expenditure,” in the view of the Office of the Public Protector,
“as it appears that the prepayment was not used to meet production requirements at OCM” (Office
of the Public Protector South Africa, 2016, p. 20). Moreover, “it appears highly improbably that
some, if not all, of the Eskom Board who approved the payment had no knowledge of the true
nature of the payment” (Office of the Public Protector South Africa, 2016, p. 20). The decision
“appears to have been in contravention” of the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA), which
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states that the Board of a state-owned enterprise has the obligation to “prevent fruitless and
wasteful expenditure” (Office of the Public Protector South Africa, 2016, p. 20).54
The purchase arrangements were facilitated by Bank of Baroda (BoB), a state-owned bank in India
with multinational operations (Office of the Public Protector, 2016, pp. 272-3). The Bank of
Baroda is now India’s the second-largest public sector undertaking and third-largest bank
(Business Today, 2019). “For more than a decade,” the New York Times reports, “the Guptas had
fostered relations with the South African branch of the Bank of Baroda” (Onishi and Gebrekidan,
2018). The bank offered a letter of support for the Guptas’ attempt to buy OCM after other banks
in South Africa had cut ties with the Guptas (ibid.).55
“The Guptas gradually came to account for a disproportionate share of BoB’s South Africa
business,” report journalists investigating what came to be known as the GuptaLeaks scandal, “to
the point that it posed a risk to the bank” (Sethi and Gopakumar, 2018). A Bank of Baroda
executive suggested, speaking off the record, that the Guptas accounted for 40% of the Bank’s
loans in the country (ibid.). The Office of the Public Protector (2016, pp. 273-4) described the
Bank of Baroda’s conduct as “highly suspicious,” and maintained that the frequency and amounts
deposited “should have attracted attention and an investigation… due to money laundering risks
based on the Financial Intelligence Centre’s (FIC’s) guidance note concerning the reporting of
suspicious and unusual financial transactions.” In 2016 the bank was fined by Prudential Authority
of the SARB for “non-compliance with the FIC Act and for deficiencies in respect of money
laundering controls” (Omarjee, 2019).56
Oakbay and the Industrial Development Corporation
In another controversial affair, in 2014 the Gupta family sought to list Oakbay Resources and
Energy on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange at a price of R10 per share. Government regulations
require that a sponsor support the listing of a new company on the stock exchange. In this case,
Sasfin Capital, a South African asset management firm, acted as the sponsor, having performed a
reasonableness assessment of the estimated valuation based on KPMG-audited financial
statements (Mail & Guardian Staff Reporter, 2017).
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The Mail & Guardian, a prominent Johannesburg weekly, reports that when the Guptas sought to
list the firm, an Oakbay director sent emails to an associate company in Singapore, Unlimited
Electronic and Computers, arranging for a R185 million loan to Unlimited through a third party in
Dubai, and that this money was then used to purchase Oakbay shares in order to boost their price
(de Wet, 2017). The Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), a state-owned development bank,
had extended a R256 million loan to Oakbay, and in 2014 this was converted into equity at R9 per
share, giving the IDC a 3.6% stake in the company (Mail & Guardian Staff Reporter, 2017). After
Sasfin withdrew its sponsorship, Oakbay was forced to delist in 2017, at which point its last traded
share price was R5.80 (Mail & Guardian Staff Reporter, 2017). The share price decline meant that
a substantial fraction of the IDC loan was, in effect, written off (de Wet, 2017).

The money merry-go-round
“Like generations of foreigners before them,” reports the New York Times, the Guptas “took their
windfall out of Africa, moving it to Dubai and India through a maze of dubious, and at times
illegal, transactions” (Gebrekidan and Onishi, 2018).
The Guptas made use of a complex network of letterbox companies and front companies to move
money through back-to-back loans and other transfers with no clear business purpose, with Bank
of Baroda facilitating many of these financial transactions, according to investigative journalists
working with the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (Sharife and Joseph,
2018b).57 Some of these transactions, the journalists report, allowed the Guptas “to move hundreds
of millions of dollars in alleged dirty deals into offshore accounts” (ibid.).
Data collected from the bank show that in the ten years between 2007 and 2017, about 4.5 billion
rand (approximately US $532 million) was transferred among Gupta-related companies, with
many of the transactions labelled as inter-company loans (see Table 4). On some days, it is
reported, Bank of Baroda employees filed up to half a dozen suspicious activity reports (SARs)
related to Gupta transactions, but bank management intervened to void the reports, so that most of
them were not reported to the South African Financial Intelligence Centre (Sharife and Joseph,
2018b). The New York Times reports that an investigation by the South African Reserve Bank
found that “Baroda’s internal systems had flagged about 4,000 suspicious transactions in the
Guptas’ accounts,” but that employees “dismissed nearly all of the alerts ‘without adequate reasons
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being provided,’ according to a confidential report by PwC, the international auditing firm, that
was reviewed by the Times” (Onishi and Gebrekidan, 2018).
Table 4: Sample list of transactions labelled as ‘inter-company loans,’ 2007-2017
Entity transferring funds
Koornfontein Mines
Oakbay Investments
Oakbay Investments
Oakbay Investments
Oakbay Investments
Oakbay Investments
Oakbay Investments
Oakbay Investments
Confident Concepts
Infinity Media
Islandsite Investments 180
Islandsite Investments 180
Islandsite Investments 180
Tegeta Exploration and Resources
Tegeta Exploration and Resources
Tegeta Exploration and Resources
Tegeta Exploration and Resources
Trillian Management Consulting
Westdawn Investments
Optimum Coal Mine
Optimum Coal Mine

Number
of transfers
9
35
2
3
25
2
26
5
4
30
10
8
26
26
11
1
1
4
1
1

Total value of
transfers (ZAR)
159,000,000
708,100,000
30,200,000
13,500,0000
576,321,190
5,500,000
14,200,000
380,200,000
174,400,000
26,500,000
655,788,000
88,819,190
105,300,000
303,900,000
579,150,000
260,000,000
24,000,000
160,246,000
142,000,000
13,500,000
25,000,000

Entity receiving funds
Tegeta Exploration and Resources
Tegeta Exploration and Resources
ldwala Coal
Infinity Media
Islandsite Investments180
Shiva Uranium
TNA Media
Westdawn Investments
Islandsite Investments180
Oakbay Investments
Oakbay Investments
Confident Concepts
Sahara Computers
Koornfontein Mines
Oakbay Investments
Optimum Coal Mine
Westdawn Investments
Centaur Mining
Oakbay Investments
Koornfontein Mines
Tegeta Resources

Source: Sharife and Joseph (2018b).

Bank of Baroda also transacted with other companies associated with the Guptas but not known to
be owned outright by them. An example was reported by journalists in the Hindustan Times, one
of India’s leading daily newspapers: In 2011-12, for example, after Bank of Baroda provided a
R16 million loan overdraft facility to Everest Global Metals, a company controlled by an Indian
businessman named Piyoosh Goyal, a Gupta company called JIC Mining Services reportedly made
the monthly interest payments on this loan on behalf of Everest (Sethi and Gopakumar, 2018).58
A risk officer at a European bank explained a possible rationale for such an arrangement: “You
want to give someone a loan, but you can’t because you’re already overexposed to them. So, you
give the loan to a front company instead” (ibid.). In this case, the Hindustan Times journalists
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report, the fronting was “so transparent” that when Everest missed a payment, the bank wrote
directly to a director of several Gupta companies to request it (ibid.).
GuptaLeaks investigators have reported that another Goyal company, called Worlds Window,
assisted the Guptas in moving millions of Rands between South Africa, India, China and the UAE
through hundreds of transactions (amaBhungane and Scorpio, 2018). Worlds Window began as a
scrap metal company in India, and diversified into other activities, including two registered
subsidiaries in South Africa. The Guptas and Worlds Window companies have often transferred
to each other money through Bank of Baroda for opaque purposes (ibid.). In 2010, for example,
Worlds Window transferred $4.4 million to Oakbay Investments, ostensibly in exchange for
minority shares in two companies that owned what the investigators describe as “questionable coal
prospecting rights in South Africa,” but the shares were never transferred to Worlds Window, and
it subsequently appeared that there was no coal (ibid.).
Round-tripping refers to two-way transactions among entities that inflate apparent revenues while
producing no net economic substance. Such transactions also can provide a mechanism for money
laundering, giving the impression that the funds originate from a clean source. Examples of roundtripping transactions between Worlds Window subsidiary Arctos Trading and Gupta firms over a
six-day period in December 2011 are depicted in Figure 22.
In another Gupta-related deal in 2011 Transnet, South Africa’s state-owned rail, port and pipeline
company, purchased cranes for South Africa’s Durban port from the Chinese state-owned
manufacturer Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy (known as ZPMC) (amaBhungane and Scorpio, 2018). At
the time, Brian Molefe was the CEO of Transnet (he then became CEO of Eskom in 2015).59 In
this deal, according to reports published by investigative journalists, ZPMC inflated the price from
R570 million ($81 million) to R659 million ($92 million) to cover so-called “commissions and
fees” for the Guptas, which were channeled through a UAE-registered firm called JJ Trading
reportedly linked to Worlds Window (amaBhungane and Scorpio, 2017a, 2018).60 The money flow
is summarized in Figure 23.
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Figure 22: Roundtripping by Guptas
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Source: amaBhungane and Scorpio (2018).

Figure 23: Kickbacks on Transnet crane purchase reportedly channeled to Guptas
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In July 2015, the Guptas purchased one of the most expensive properties in Dubai, overlooking
the Montgomerie golf course, for R331 million ($26 million) (amaBhungane and Scorpio, 2017b).
AmaBhungane reports that executives of several “captured” state-owned enterprises, including
Eskom and Transnet, visited the Guptas there (amaBhungane and Scorpio, 2017b). Duduzane
Zuma reportedly purchased a R17.9 million ($1.2 million) apartment in Dubai, too (ibid.). If the
outflows that financed these purchases were not reported to the SARB and recorded in South
Africa’s balance of payments accounts, they would contribute to measured capital flight from the
country.

The network of enablers
The corruption that has facilitated state capture, capital flight, and money laundering in South
Africa is intermediated by a transnational network of enablers with deep connections in the public
and private sectors in South Africa and complex linkages across the world. As well as banks, the
enablers include accounting firms, clearing houses, law firms, and management consulting firms.
In February 2020, the non-governmental investigative consortium Open Secrets and Shadow
World Investigations submitted a detailed joint report to the South African government’s
Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture (the Zondo Commission). “Unpicking
the Gupta racketeering enterprise requires scrutiny of private sector facilitators,” the report
concluded. “Specifically, the enterprise required banks, law firms, accounting firms and other
professionals both to facilitate transactions; and to fail to perform their lawful due diligence
requirements” (Marchant et al., 2020, p. 8).
The accountants
An arrangement involving the Free State provincial government illustrates the enabling role of
international accounting firms.
Between 2013 and 2016, journalists reported a web of alleged linkages between Gupta enterprises
and the Free State government, depicted in Figure 24 (amaBhungane and Scorpio, 2017c).61 The
province’s Premier, Ace Magashule (now Secretary General of the African National Congress)
had characterized the Estina dairy project near the town of Vrede as a “state-of-the-art certified
facility” that would process 100,000 liters of milk per day (amaBhungane, 2013b). The Free State
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department of agriculture, then under the leadership of the Mosebenzi Zwane (who, as mentioned
earlier, would go on to become the nation’s Mineral Resources minister) “promised Estina R114million a year for three years to set up a farming operation and dairy, whose supposed purpose was
to empower locals and boost provincial agriculture” (amaBhungane and Scorpio, 2017c). Between
2013 and 2016, a total of R220 million was transferred from the department of agriculture to
Estina, but journalists report that most of this money was captured by the Gupta network (African
News Agency, 2019; Pather, 2018b).
Figure 24: Estina dairy project cash flows
Free
State
Gov

2013: R114m for
Estina Dairy Project

Aug 11-Sept24: R84m of
this transferred to Dubai

Dubai
R84m
±R1.7m for dairy
equipment

Aug 12: ± R4m
Sept 9: ± R13.5m

Aug 11: ± R16m
Sept 5: ± R10m

Sept 23: ±
R30m

Global
Corporation
(Dubai – Guptas)
Aug ± R1.9m

Sept 8: ±
R1.45m
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Investments (Dubai
- Guptas)
R30m for wedding
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Star Engineers
(Saharanpur,
India)

Linkway Trading
(South Africa –
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Source: GuptaLeaks documents as reported by (amaBhungane and Scorpio, 2017c).
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In 2018, the Mail & Guardian reported that there is “little evidence to suggest Estina ever
processed a drop of milk” (Pather, 2018b). The paper reported that R30 million (roughly $3
million) from the farm was used to pay for the lavish 2013 wedding of a Gupta family member.
According to the newspaper, this money was channeled through a company called Linkway, where
the wedding was designated as a “business expense” (Pather, 2018b). The investigative journalism
unit amaBhungane concluded that a total of R144 million in state funds for the Estina project was
transferred to a Dubai-based company linked to the Guptas (Pather, 2018b).
In 2018, the Bloemfontein High Court ruled that Atul Gupta had “unlawfully received” R10
million from the Estina dairy and ordered a freeze on his bank account, after the National
Prosecuting Authority’s (NPA) said in court papers that Gupta had been the beneficiary of
“proceeds of a crime” (Pather, 2018a). Atul Gupta appealed in an attempt to recover the funds
(Pather, 2018a). “It remains a mystery,” the head of the Asset Forfeiture Unit replied in an affidavit
submitted to the court, how Gupta “can have an interest in a property that he clearly denies ever
receiving in the first place” (Gous, 2018b). The NPA provisionally dropped its case in November
2018, citing a lack of response to mutual legal assistance requests made to India and the United
Arab Emirates (TimesLive, 2018).
The global accounting firm KPMG had audited Linkway, the firm through which the wedding
expenses were routed. In early 2019, KPMG partner Jacques Wessels was removed from South
Africa’s register of auditors for having engaged in what the Independent Regulatory Board for
Auditors termed an “egregious form of dishonesty” in his work for the Gupta family in auditing
Linkway in 2014 (Marriage, 2019). The regulatory board concluded that Wessels had shifted R6.9
million of Linkway’s wedding-related hotel and accommodation expenses from the firm’s
operating expenses to its cost of sales, and had treated this as an “unspecified tax deductible”
amount even after being advised by a KPMG colleague that the tax deduction was impermissible
(Marriage, 2019). “This kind of sanction is rare,” the Financial Times of London reported. “No
auditor was struck off the regulator’s register in 2018 or 2017, and only two in 2016” (Marriage,
2019).
In another case with even more far-reaching implications, KPMG was hired by the South African
Revenue Service (SARS) to prepare what became known as the “rogue unit report.” 62 This report,
dated 26 January 2016, lent credence to a narrative cultivated by the Zuma-appointed SARS
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Commissioner Tom Moyane that his predecessor, Pravin Gordhan, who according to the New York
Times was “widely credited with building up the tax agency as its commissioner from 1999 to
2009,” had illegally set up a rogue investigative unit to combat tax evasion, particularly in the
illicit tobacco trade (Gebrekidan and Onishi, 2018).63 The KPMG report became a tool in a broader
campaign waged by the Zuma government against opponents of the looting then taking place
within South African state institutions. In 2017, after leaked emails revealed “chummy ties
between close Zuma allies and top KPMG officials,” KPMG withdrew the report’s main
conclusions and recommendations, in what New York Times reporters described as “a staggering
mea culpa” (ibid.).64 In a hearing before Parliament, the firm admitted that the report’s conclusions
and recommendations had, in fact, not been its own product, but instead were copied “by and large
verbatim” from a memo drafted by the tax agency (ibid.). KPMG announced that it would pay
back the R23 million it had been paid for the work (Hosken, 2017).
The consulting firms
As reported by the New York Times and the South African media, in late 2015 McKinsey &
Company, the global management consulting firm, entered into a contract with Eskom to draw up
a reorganization plan that would address the numerous problems the utility had faced in recent
years (Bogdanich and Forsythe, 2018).65 Under the terms of the contract, which was awarded
without competitive bidding and would become McKinsey’s “biggest contract ever in Africa, with
a potential value of $700 million,” the firm would be paid for its work only if its advice generated
results, but with no cap on what the final bill would be – a departure from the standard fee-forservice arrangement mandated by the South African government, from which Eskom failed to
receive a waiver despite telling McKinsey that it had done so (ibid.). “It did not take a Harvard
Business School graduate,” the New York Times commented, “ to explain why South Africans
might get angry seeing a wealthy American firm cart away so much public money in a country
with the worst income inequality in the world” (ibid.).
In its work for Eskom, McKinsey sub-contracted a minority consulting partner called Trillian
Management Consulting in order to comply with the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE)
requirements for public procurement, despite the fact that Trillian refused to divulge its ownership
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(Bogdanich and Forsythe, 2018).66 Trillian’s majority owner later turned out to be Salim Essa,
whose associations with the Guptas included part ownership of Tegeta, which purchased OCM in
the same year (ibid.).
As the South African news media uncovered ever more evidence of the Gupta family’s influence,
“Eskom – not McKinsey – prematurely terminated the contract,” the New York Times reported in
2018. “The abbreviated tab for barely eight months of work: nearly $100 million, with close to 40
percent going to Trillian” (Bogdanich and Forsythe, 2018).67 The New York Times reporters noted
a “bitter irony: While McKinsey’s pay was supposed to be based entirely on its results, it is far
from clear that the flailing power company is much better off than it was before” (ibid.).
A forensic investigation commissioned by the National Treasury concluded that Eskom officials
contravened sections 57 and 79 of the Public Finance Management Act by: (i) failing to curb
“irregular and wasteful expenditure of R1.6 billion”; (ii) registering Trillian as an Eskom vendor,
even though Trillian itself did not have a contract with Eskom; and (iii) failing to seek permission
from National Treasury for the risk-based contract (South African National Treasury, 2018a, p.
241). The National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) alleged that McKinsey had been instrumental in
“creating a veil of legitimacy to what was otherwise a nonexistent, unlawful arrangement”
(Bogdanich and Forsythe, 2018). In December 2017, the Pretoria High Court decided to freeze the
fees received by McKinsey and Trillian for advising Eskom (ibid.; Winning 2018).68
A 2018 report by the South African Parliament’s Portfolio Committee on Public Enterprises
concluded that “McKinsey’s potential use of Trillian, a Gupta-linked company, to extract rents
from Eskom may constitute criminal conduct” (Portfolio Committee on Public Enterprises, 2018,
p. 49).69 A spokesperson for McKinsey “thanked the committee for its work,” the Financial Times
reported, “and said it was studying its recommendations” (Cotterill, 2018c). McKinsey elected to
repay over one billion rand to Eskom, including interest on the amount received by the firm, while
indicating that “the fee repayment was a consequence of Eskom’s non-compliance with the
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relevant procurement laws and was not an admission of liability by McKinsey” (South African
National Treasury, 2018a, p. 232).
In June 2019, in a Gauteng High Court case between Eskom and respondents McKinsey and
Trillian, the court ordered Trillian to repay a further R595 million, plus interest, to Eskom (South
African Gauteng Division High Court, 2016, p. 51). In August 2019, Trillian CEO Eric Wood filed
an appeal against the court’s decision, claiming that Trillian does not have the money and alleging
that Salim Essa, now living comfortably in Dubai, had paid out the money to himself in
“shareholder loans” that cannot be recovered (Bezuidenhout, 2019a). In October 2019, the U.S.
Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control sanctioned the three Gupta brothers and
Salim Essa, describing them as “members of a significant corruption network in South Africa that
leveraged overpayments on government contracts, bribery, and other corrupt acts to fund political
contributions and influence government actions” (U.S. Treasury, 2019). “We will continue to
exclude from the U.S. financial system those who profit from corruption.”
McKinsey and KPMG are not the only international consulting and auditing firms to have been
caught up in South Africa’s “state capture” scandals. In October 2019, the new management of
Eskom filed court papers claiming that the global firm Deloitte had engaged in “pure corruption”
through “unfair, inequitable, non-transparent and uncompetitive” consulting contracts with Eskom
awarded in 2016, and demanded that the consulting firm pay back more than $13 million it had
received (Wells, 2019). The acting CEO Eskom stated that the fees charged in two contracts were
“five times” higher than those of their competitors (ibid.). Deloitte initially disputed the charges
(Wells, 2019).70 In March 2020, the two parties reached an agreement in which Deloitte agreed to
repay R150 million (approximately $8.5 million), representing a portion of the fees invoiced, “in
full and final settlement of the matter.”71
The bankers
Foremost among the banking institutions that have been implicated in state capture in South Africa
is Bank of Baroda, whose involvement with the Gupta family has been discussed above. In
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February 2018, after 21 years of operating in the country, the bank notified the South African
Reserve Bank (SARB) that it would to close down its operations (Mehta, 2018). The
announcement came in the midst of a SARB probe into alleged breaches of banking regulations,
most of which involved transactions related the Gupta family and its companies. Bank of Baroda
asserted that its decision to exit South Africa was part of its “strategic plan for rationalization of
overseas branches” (Bhardwaj, 2018). In 2019, after its withdrawal, Bank of Baroda was fined a
modest R400,000 (about $25,000) for what the South African Reserve Bank termed “deficiencies
relating to compliance with the FIC [Financial Intelligence Center] Act” and “weaknesses in
controls to prevent potential money laundering and terrorist financing” (Omarjee, 2019).72
Again, Bank of Baroda was not the only major bank touched by the scandals. Business Day
reported that Nedbank, one of South Africa’s ‘Big Four’ domestic banks, had a “correspondent
banking relationship” with Bank of Baroda, clearing transactions for the latter through control
accounts at SARB (Gous, 2018a).73 The Enablers, a joint report submitted to the Zondo
Commission on state capture in February 2020 by investigators from Open Secrets and Shadow
World Investigations, states that Standard Bank, another of the Big Four, was used by the Guptas
to launder funds looted from the Free State government in the Estina dairy scandal, reporting that
“in a large number of cases, deposits made into Standard Bank accounts were immediately
transferred onto external beneficiaries” (Marchant et al., 2020, pp. 102-103). The transactions
reportedly included the transfer of $8.3 million offshore into a Standard Chartered account of a
Dubai-registered company (Marchant et al., 2020, pp. 102-103). When asked whether it had filed
any suspicious activity reports in connection with these transactions, Standard Bank replied that it
could not disclose confidential information relating to its clients and assured the investigators that
it had “complied with its regulatory responsibilities” (Marchant et al., 2020, pp. 102-103).
A full anatomy of the complex network that has facilitated capital flight, money laundering, tax
evasion, and state capture in South Africa would require a book-length narrative. Some of the links
among the actors are formal, others informal; some are open, others remain hidden. A schematic
depiction of the Gupta-related network sketched above is presented in Figure 25. Further
untangling this and other webs and is a critical task to devise effective strategies to combat capital
flight and its adverse consequences in South Africa.
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Figure 25: The network of enablers

Source: Designed using information from the sources cited in the text.74

74

The authors thank Professor Kevin Young of the University of Massachusetts Amherst who designed this chart.

61

7.

Tax amnesties and capital flight

The transition to democracy in 1994 carried high expectations of ‘liberation dividends’ in terms of
employment, access to education and other social services, and the elevation of living standards in
general for the historically alienated population – people of color. The primary challenge faced by
the ANC government was to mobilize sufficient resources to respond to these expectations by
financing its ambitious growth and redistribution agenda. Two important handicaps to resource
mobilization were the inefficiencies of the tax system and the threat of capital flight. The postapartheid government inherited a culture of deep public distrust of the state that disincentivized
tax compliance. At the same time, the uncertainty of the post-liberation environment was a
potential motive for smuggling capital out of the country.
To address these challenges, the government embarked on a series of tax reforms and exchange
regulations aimed at increasing revenue, curbing capital outflows, and inducing the repatriation of
private wealth held offshore. It is in this context that the government set up the Commission of
Inquiry into Certain Aspects of the Tax Structure of South Africa, known as the Katz Commission
after its chairman, Professor Michael Katz. In presenting the third interim report on taxation of the
Katz Commission, the Joint Standing Committee on Financial Management of the Parliament
(JSCFMP) stated the following:
Trying to achieve the goals of strong and sustainable economic growth, development and
meaningful alleviation of poverty in a time of increasing international economic
competitiveness is a daunting challenge for any country. Amongst any government's policy
options are various fiscal instruments, of which taxation is one of the most influential.
Reform of tax systems, and of tax structures within those systems, has therefore become a
necessary pursuit for countries with such goals in mind (JSCFMP, 1994, p. 2)
One recommendation of the Katz Commission was the use of tax amnesty to boost revenue and
enhance compliance.75 The idea of a tax amnesty had also been advanced in 1986 by the Margo
Commission, chaired by Supreme Court Justice Cecil Stanley Margo (South African National
Treasury, 1987).
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Tax Amnesty of 1995
The first tax amnesty was issued in 1995, with the aim of providing taxpayers in default with a
once-off time-bound window of opportunity to voluntarily declare and pay previously evaded
taxes in exchange for exoneration of financial penalties and criminal prosecution. In principle, the
1995 tax amnesty was expected to boost tax revenue in two ways: by encouraging payment of back
taxes by taxpayers who did not report or had under-reported their liabilities but would not come
forward for fear of prosecution; and by incentivizing taxpayers, including small businesses, to
come into the tax pool once they were assured of no penalties of past non-filling of tax returns. It
was hoped that the amnesty would also reduce the incentives for capital flight, insofar as it is
driven, in part, by fear of penalties for tax evasion. This effect could be enhanced when the scope
of amnesty is expanded to include exoneration of violations of exchange control regulations, as
was done in the subsequent amnesties as described below.

Tax Amnesty of 2003
On 15 May 2003, Finance Minister Trevor Manuel introduced the Exchange Control Amnesty and
Amendment of Tax Laws Bill, which was passed that year (South African National Treasury,
2003a). The major innovation in the 2003 Tax Amnesty was that it covered wealth held offshore.
It included amnesty for contraventions to the Exchange Controls Regulations Act of 1961,76 as
well as relief from penalties on past tax defaults. The 2003 amnesty was not applicable to the
evasion of taxes on domestic income and earnings.
Prior to this initiative, in 2001 South Africa had changed its tax rules on the treatment of
international income to ensure that all income and assets are brought into the tax basket, regardless
of where they are earned and held and reported. The rationale for the 2003 amnesty was expressed
as follows:
Many South African individuals have a long history of shifting assets offshore in
contravention of Exchange Control. These illegal shifts commenced well before the 1980s,
having occurred in a variety of ways. The revenue from these illegal foreign assets typically
goes unreported for income tax purposes. These foreign assets may even stem from
unreported domestically derived amounts (South African National Treasury, 2003b, p. 5).
Chapter 1 of the Bill was specifically dedicated to amnesty for transgressions of exchange control
regulations. The exchange control relief exonerated owners of offshore assets from legal penalties
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South African National Treasury (1961).
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for contraventions of the exchange control regulations committed when they had transferred funds
abroad without proper declarations. Once approved, the applicant was to pay an ‘amnesty levy’ of
5% of the fair market value (as of February 2003) of foreign assets disclosed and repatriated to
South Africa, and 10% of the market value of assets disclosed but kept offshore. Foreign asset
disclosure also carried a relief of tax penalty on foreign income and interest earnings that had not
been disclosed up to 28 February 2003. It further provided exoneration for associated criminal
offenses, so long as the funds that generated the foreign assets were not themselves obtained from
illegal activities.
The 2003 tax amnesty also addressed an important institutional issue, regarding the exchange of
information between the SARS and the SARB. Past laws had precluded such exchanges of
information between the two entities, and it was argued that these restrictions had undermined the
efficiency and capacity of these institutions to detect, track and prosecute transgressions of tax
laws (the purview of SARS) and exchange control regulations (the purview of SARB). These
restrictions were amended or removed (South African National Treasury, 2003a, pp. clauses 34,
39, 46, and 48).77
Four key arguments were advanced in support of the policy innovations in the 2003 amnesty. First,
in the government’s assessment, South Africa offered unique opportunities for higher returns to
investment than abroad. Treasury bill rates in South Africa and GDP growth, a proxy for overall
returns to domestic investment, compared favorably, for example, with Treasury bill rates in the
United States (see Figure 26). Higher expected returns in South Africa could also arise from pentup growth acceleration with the end of apartheid, as the country benefited from integration in the
global economy.
Second, enhanced international cooperation in tax compliance, by virtue of bilateral tax treaties
entered into by the government, were increasing the probability of detection of tax fraud, and
this would not only discourage future tax evasion but also encourage past evaders to take
advantage of the amnesty (see Box 1).
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Figure 26: GDP growth in South Africa and T-Bill rates in South Africa vs. USA, 19902003 (quarterly series)
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Third, enhanced international cooperation in surveillance of capital flows, alongside the tax
treaties, was expected to help curb illicit capital outflows and thereby further encourage
demand for domestic assets. According to the introductory note that accompanied the 2003
Amnesty, the international environment offered a unique opportunity for regulatory reform in
South Africa:
The international legislative environment is also a riskier place for illegal foreign assets.
Government has greatly expanded its tax treaty network since 1994, thereby facilitating
greater international co-operation for South African enforcement. The world community
has simultaneously grown increasingly impatient with tax haven countries with bank
secrecy and other laws designed to serve as a tax refuge for illegal foreign assets. This
impatience with bank secrecy has recently accelerated with the increased understanding
that bank secrecy can encourage terrorism and other illegal activities (such as money
laundering). (South African National Treasury, 2003b)
The global war against terrorism in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in the United States had mobilized
international efforts to combat illicit financing for terrorism and other illicit financial flows.
Finally, the government’s vigorous moves towards economic reforms also included new,
complementary laws and institutions to combat tax evasion and illicit financial flows, such as the
Financial Intelligence Act.
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Box 1: South Africa’s Bilateral Tax Treaties Since 1994
South Africa has signed several types of bilateral and multilateral tax treaties since 1994 with countries in
Africa, Asia, Europe and Central and North America (SARS website): double taxation agreements (DTA)
and protocols; air and sea agreements; estate duty agreements; exchange of information agreements;
multilateral mutual administrative assistance (MAAs) on customs; trade agreements; one-stop-border posts
agreements; MAAs on value added tax; and other international agreements.
South Africa has a large number of bilateral double taxation agreements (DTAs), 23 within Africa and 57
with the rest of the world. Most of these were signed after 1994, although a number were in effect earlier.
For example, Zimbabwe had a DTA with South Africa since 1956, Switzerland since 1967, Malawi since
1971, and Israel since 1979. Some older agreements have also been updated over time.
South Africa has signed DTAs and protocols with several countries that are known to be tax havens, such as
Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Singapore, Switzerland and the UAE. To date, no such agreements exist
with other known offshore wealth centers such as the Bahamas, Bermuda, Cayman Island, Jersey or
Mauritius.
In December 2016, the South African Revenue Service (SARS) put in place an agreement with the
government of the United Arab Emirates for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal
evasion relating to taxes on income. Under this agreement, both states agree to exchange relevant information
to enforce domestic laws concerning taxes of every kind. The information will be treated as secret, but it can
be used to disclose information in court proceedings or judicial decisions (SARS, 2016a). A similar
agreement has been in place with India since 1997 and China since 2001. However, each of these agreements
covers fewer income categories than most prior agreements,and contains more caveats on the exchange of
information.
South Africa’s bilateral tax information exchange agreements are more recent. These relate primarily to
countries with which there are no existing DTAs, which typically would include an exchange of information
agreement. Notably, several of these countries are often described as offshore tax havens, including the
Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, and Jersey. In addition, in 2017 South Africa entered into
stronger agreements with the US and OECD countries known as ‘automatic exchange of information.’ These
provide for the transfer of bulk taxpayer information on various income categories in order to fight against
international tax evasion.
In 2007, a special agreement on customs and tax administration cooperation was established among South
Africa, Brazil and India – three of the five BRICS nations. The agreement has four main objectives: to
facilitate legitimate trade and investment; to combat commercial fraud, drug trafficking, money laundering
and other illicit trade activities; to curb abusive tax avoidance transactions; and to modernize customs and
tax administration through capacity building and cooperation (SARS, 2007).
The remaining three categories of agreements relate to international trade. These include multilateral customs
agreements, notably the long-established Southern African Customs Union (SACU). There are four major
trade agreements, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) trade agreement, the African
Growth and Opportunity Act agreement with the USA, a memorandum of understanding with China on
promoting bilateral trade and economic cooperation, and the free trade agreement between European states
and SACU states. There is a specific border post agreement with Mozambique that aims to reduce border
crossing times and associated logistics, and to improve cooperation and information management. Finally,
there is an MAA with Lesotho and Swaziland for improving the exchange of information and assisting with
surveillance and investigations related to value added tax.
Source: SARS website: https://www.sars.gov.za/Legal/International-Treaties-Agreements/Pages/default.aspx.
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For these reasons it was hoped that, going forward, the new policy environment would make it
harder to evade taxes and less attractive to smuggle capital from the country and conceal it abroad.

Small Business Tax Amnesty of 2006
The 2006 Small Business Tax Amnesty (South African National Treasury, 2006) was introduced
initially to address problems in the taxi industry, along with reforms of the sector including a
recapitalization program. It was broadened to all small businesses with annual revenue not
exceeding R10 million. The main objective was to facilitate the formalization of small enterprises,
so as to bring them into the tax net (SARS, 2006). The amnesty sought to alleviate the fears of
small businesses related to past non-compliance and any resulting tax liabilities, penalties and
interests.

Voluntary Disclosure Program of 2010
In 2010, the government enacted the Voluntary Disclosure Program and Tax Laws Second
Amendment Act No. 8 (VDP) (SARS, 2010b), whose objective was ‘to enhance voluntary
compliance in the interest of enhanced tax compliance, good management of the tax system and
the best use of SARS resources… [and] to encourage taxpayers to come forward on a voluntary
basis to regularize their tax affairs with SARS and avoid the imposition of understatement penalties
and administrative penalties’ (SARS, 2010a, p. 2). Approved applicants for amnesty would not be
criminally prosecuted for a tax offence arising from prior default and they would receive relief or
reduction of understatement penalties.
In enacting the VDP, South Africa joined a long list of countries that have experimented with the
instrument as a means of enhancing compliance and boosting tax revenue. A review by the OECD
identified a number of features that are important for the success of VDPs, including ‘a tangible,
credible and time-limited incentive’ for the eligible population to participate, and ‘substantially
increased risk’ of detection for those who do not do so. The review emphasized that the program
should not end up compromising long-term compliance for the sake of short-term boost to revenue:
‘Tax evaders need to be brought into compliance for good – not reinforced in the belief that they
need only comply when special terms are on offer. If the programme is presented as a once-off
opportunity, that presentation must be credible’ (OECD, 2010, p. 13).
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Special Voluntary Disclosure Program of 2016
In 2016, the opportunities offered under the VDP 2010 were expanded with the enactment of the
Special Voluntary Disclosure Programme (SVDP). Under the SVDP, the Financial Surveillance
Department of the SARB gave South African residents another opportunity to regularize the status
of their foreign assets vis-à-vis the Exchange Control Regulations of 1961 (as amended). The
program offered a one-time window of opportunity, initially fixed to run from October 1, 2016 to
31 August 2017.78 While the target audience of the 2010 VDP was taxpayers in default vis-à-vis
the Tax Administration Act, including defaults on foreign taxable income, the 2016 SVDP
explicitly targeted South African taxpayers with offshore assets and income.79
The SVDP excluded residents with current or pending investigations of contraventions of
regulations, as well as assets that were obtained from illegal activities. To that effect, under the
SVDP, disclosures had to include ‘confirmation of the sources of all unauthorized foreign assets,
details of the manner in which such assets were transferred and retained abroad as well as proof of
the market value of the unauthorized assets as of February 28, 2016’ (SARB, 2016, p. 10 (C.ii)).
Application for SVDP carried a fee, a price in exchange of the pecuniary and legal benefits that
would accrue from a successful application. Table 5 outlines the benefits from the tax dimension
(enforced by SARS) and the exchange control dimension (enforced by SARB) of the program.

Did South Africa’s tax amnesties pay off?
A number of questions may be raised about the results of the various amnesties adopted over the
past years. Answers to those questions may help to assess the merit of such initiatives as well as
to explore remedial strategies going forward. Four questions are considered here:
1. Did the taxpayers take up the opportunities offered by the government to regularize tax defaults
and contraventions of exchange controls?
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The SVDP closing date was first extended from 31 March 2017 to 30 June 2017, then finally to 31 August 2017
despite requests to extend it to September 30th, which was denied because the start of the international automatic
exchange of information was set to begin in September 2017. SARS, “Voluntary Disclosure Programme (VDP),”
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Table 5: Relief provided by the SVDP, 2016

Capital that funded the
asset (‘seed money’,
capitalized returns and
subsequent deposits

SARS

SARB

The undeclared income that originally
gave rise to the foreign asset will be exempt
from income tax, donations tax and estate
duty liabilities arising in the past.

A levy of 5 per cent on the value of the
unauthorized foreign assets or the sale
proceeds thereof as at 29 February 2016, if
such assets are repatriated to the Republic of
South Africa. The 5 per cent levy must be
paid from foreign sourced funds.

40% of highest value of aggregate of
all assets situated outside South
Africa between (or deemed to be
between) 1 March 2010 and 20
February 2015 that were derived from
undeclared income will be included
in taxable income and subject to tax
in South Africa in the 2015 tax
period. The value referred to above is
the highest market value as at the end
of the tax period, in the relevant
foreign currency translated to South
African Rand at the spot rate at the
end of the tax period in which the
highest value fell.

A levy of 10 per cent the value of the
unauthorized foreign asset as at 29
February 2016, if such assets are retained
abroad. The 10 per cent levy must be paid
from foreign sourced funds.
A levy of 12 per cent the value of the
unauthorized foreign asset as at 29
February 2016 in circumstances where the 10 per
cent levy is not paid from foreign sourced funds.

Investment returns & other Investment earnings & other taxable events
taxable events
prior to 1 Maren 2015 will be exempt from
tax

Not applicable

Interest on SARS debt

Interest on tax debt arising from the
disclosure only commence from the 2015
year of assessment

Not applicable

No understatement penalties will be
levied

Not applicable

Understatement
penalties

Source: SARS (2016b).

Tax amnesties could be judged successful only if a meaningful number of taxpayers voluntarily
disclose their tax liabilities and their unauthorized foreign assets.80 Unfortunately, we were not
able to find adequate data to provide a definitive answer to this question. One might imagine that
the SARS and SARB would find it beneficial to encourage public support for these programs by
systematically tracking, compiling, and publicizing data on their outcomes. Curiously little has
been done in this respect.
The available data indicate only modest revenue returns from the amnesties. In a 2018 speech at
SARS, the Minister of Finance reported that the ongoing VDP had yielded R10.8 billion since
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For reviews of the results of tax amnesties in other countries, see (OECD, 2015). and (Johannesen et al., 2018).
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2012 (South African National Treasury, 2018b). SARS reports that the VDP collected an
additional R3.2 billion in tax revenue for the 2018-2019 financial year (SARS, 2019). This would
bring the cumulative additional revenue collected under the program over seven years to R14
billion (US $1 billion), equivalent to roughly 0.5% of total personal income tax collections over
the period.81
On October 10, 2017, less than two months after the close of the window for SVDP applications,
it was announced that approximately 2,000 taxpayers had taken advantage of the program.82 In
March 2018, SARS reported R2.7 billion in revenue receipts out of a total of R3.3 billion in
settlements from approved applications.83 The R3.3 billion in approved settlements represented
0.7% of total personal income tax collected in 2017/18.84 The pool of applicants included 759 high
net worth individuals (individuals with liquid assets over $1 million). According to SARS, some
of the agreements were prompted by revelations contained in the ‘Panama Papers.’85
In 2019, SARS updated the amount collected under the SVDP to R3.6 billion in in the 2017-2018
financial year and a further R817 million in the 2018-2019 financial year, resulting in a total of
R4.4 billion in additional tax revenue from the program (SARS, 2019). SARS media releases
suggest that the value of foreign assets disclosed under the SVDP amounted to about R35 billion
(equivalent to $2.4 billion at the 2019 R/$ exchange rate) (SARS, 2019, p. 65).
Little is publicly known about the returns to South Africa’s earlier tax amnesty programs. A media
report states, however, that the 2003 program revealed that assets worth R48 billion ($3.3 billion)
were held abroad illegally by about 43,000 South African citizens (van Zyl, 2017).
The aggregate impact of the tax amnesties on tax revenue is difficult to measure, not only due to
lack of detailed information on the yields for each initiative, but also because tax revenue is
influenced by a multitude of factors, some of which work in the same direction and others in
opposite direction as the effects of tax amnesty. Since the first amnesty, total revenue has grown
81

Cumulative personal income tax from 2011/2012 to 2018/2019 amounted to R2957.58 billion. Amounts in rand
are converted in US dollars using the average R/$ exchange rate for 2018 and 2019.
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SARS, media release, “Over R1 billion from SVDP and still counting,” Pretoria, Tuesday 10 October 2017.
https://www.sars.gov.za/Media/MediaReleases/Pages/10-October-2017---SARS-collected-over-R1-billion-from2018-SVDP-applications.aspx
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SARS, media release, “SARS reaches R3.3-billion mark in SVDP,” Pretoria, 08 March 2018.
https://www.sars.gov.za/Media/MediaReleases/Pages/8-March-2018---SARS-reaches-over-R3-billion-mark-inSVDP.aspx.
84
SARS online data, https://www.sars.gov.za/About/SATaxSystem/Pages/Tax-Statistics.aspx.
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SARS, media release, “SARS reaches R3.3-billion mark in SVDP,” Pretoria, 08 March 2018.
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steadily, punctuated by a dip during the global recession in 2008-2010, but as a ratio of GDP it
increased only modestly, from 22% in 1995 to 26% today (Figure 27).

Figure 27: Tax Revenue: volume and % of GDP, 1994/95-2018/19
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It could be expected that the amnesty would have more direct impact on certain types of tax than
others. For example, company tax and personal income tax revenues are expected to be affected
more than consumption-related taxes such as VAT. As can be seen in Figure 28, personal income
tax and company tax have moved in opposite directions from 2007 to 2018. While personal income
tax has represented an increasing share of total taxes (from 30% to 38%), the share of company
tax has declined by 9 percentage points (from 25% to 16%). The share of VAT, the other major
component of total tax revenue has held steady, despite the 2018 increase in the VAT rate from
14% to 15%. These shares imply that the burden of taxation is increasingly falling on labor rather
than capital, which tends to worsen inequality.
2. Did the amnesties help curb capital flight?
It is even more difficult to assess the impact of tax amnesties on capital flight and total wealth held
offshore. The post-1994 era was marked by an acceleration of capital flight, as discussed above,
as well as normal capital outflows in the form of outward FDI and portfolio investment. Amnesties
for transgression of exchange control regulations do not appear to have reduced the appetite for
unauthorized foreign assets. South Africans still hold substantial wealth offshore, some of which
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undoubtedly was not only transferred abroad illegally, but also acquired illegally and concealed
abroad in contravention of tax laws as well as exchange control regulations.
Figure 28: Tax revenue by source: percentage of total tax revenue, 2007/08-2018/19
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High Net Worth Individuals (HNWIs) are notorious for low tax compliance. The SARS rather
softly points out this issue in its 2017/18 Annual Performance Report as follows: ‘A significant
number of HNWIs do not timeously pay the correct amount of taxes due to non-declaration of
income sources, overstating expenses and splitting of income through trusts’ (SARS, 2018, p. 12).
The extent to which amnesties will help repatriate private wealth held abroad by HNWIs remains
an open question.
3. Did the amnesties enhance tax compliance more generally?
The impact of past amnesties on tax compliance is also difficult to decipher. The fact that the
government has implemented repeated amnesties poses a challenge in its own. One argument
against amnesties is that they can create perverse incentives, inducing some taxpayers to default
on their taxes or send their wealth abroad in anticipation of future amnesties. Moreover, as the
amnesty levy often is small in comparison with the expected returns to investment of savings on
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tax liabilities, it would make financial sense to cheat any government that is perceived as being
likely to grant amnesties repeatedly. In the end, these may decrease compliance over time.
Several structural and institutional factors have undermined the effectiveness of tax amnesties in
South Africa. The first is limited capacity of the SARS and the SARB to detect and investigate
transgressions of tax laws and exchange control regulations. This capacity deficit has been
exacerbated by politically induced instability in leadership, especially at SARS and the Treasury.
The resulting public perception of poor governance also discourages tax compliance. The
2017/2018 Annual Performance Plan of the SARS identified ‘unfavorable public perception of
poor state delivery and corruption’ as one of the major constraints to improved tax performance.
The report notes that taxpayers’ willingness to comply is influenced by how they perceive taxes to
be utilized, and that public concerns about corruption and poor service delivery remain an issue
(SARS, 2018, p. 12).
In keeping with the adage that ‘fish rots from the head,’ this problem is particularly acute when
the public believes that top leaders do not pay taxes, or worse, steal from the government. Writing
in the New York Times, Selam Gebrekidan and Norimitsu Onishi illustrate this with the case of
former President Jacob Zuma and his family, who have been accused of tax evasion: “South
Africa’s young democracy had depended on the faith — and taxes — of its people since the end
of apartheid, so the risks were evident. If the leader of the African National Congress, his relatives
and his influential associates could dodge their tax duties, the rest of the country might shirk them,
too, hollowing out the government’s ability to function at the most basic level” (Gebrekidan and
Onishi, 2018). The effectiveness of instruments such as tax amnesties hinges of the quality of
governance throughout the state system, and especially on a leadership committed to setting and
enforcing high standards of honesty and transparency and demonstrating this commitment by
example.
Another obstacle to tax compliance, one that is unlikely to be substantially affected by tax
amnesties, is the large size of the nation’s illicit economy. The SARS 2017/18 Annual
Performance Plan cites the example of the illicit trade in cigarettes and tobacco (p. 11). Similarly,
tax performance is undermined by smuggling and fraud in international trade, a major channel of
for transgressions of exchange control regulations and illicit outflows to secrecy jurisdictions
(SARS, 2018, p. 13).
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In addition, South Africa hosts a substantial number of multinational corporations, operating in
key sectors such as mining and services. As SARS has observed, these firms are often adept at
avoiding taxes and skirting exchange control: ‘SARS has detected an evolution from businesses,
especially multinational enterprises, whereby they utilize domestic and international loopholes to
evade tax and impermissibly avoid, take advantage of cross-border structuring and transfer pricing
manipulations’ (SARS, 2018, p. 12).
The fundamental question of whether and if so, how much, the government and the economy at
large have benefited from the tax and exchange control amnesties declared over the past 25 years
remains open. But an important concern is the public’s unease with measures that are seen as
inevitably benefiting large corporations and high net worth individuals who amassed wealth
abroad, often illegally. Amnesty for tax evasion and transgressions of exchange controls is
ultimately amnesty for capital flight, too. Commenting on the 2010 VDP, economists Sam
Ashman, Ben Fine and Susan Newman put it as follows:
SARB’s proposal for an amnesty for capital flight at 10 per cent as a move towards total
freedom of legal capital export can be seen as comparable to a policy to grant an illegal
firearm ownership amnesty as a move towards allowing legal ownership without a license
at all. South African conglomerates took the ‘post-apartheid dividend’ abroad illegally
and now they look set to be granted a voluntary amnesty for doing so again at very little
cost to themselves, with no incentive to declare, and with the promise of total freedom in
the future (Ashman et al., 2011, p. 22).
In a country facing serious challenges of systemic and grand corruption, there is a real risk that tax
and exchange control amnesties are seen as just another way of exonerating the sins of the
economically and politically influential corporations and individuals while robbing the
government of valuable resources that could be used to improve the living standards of the majority
of the people. In sum, while the economic case for amnesties as a means to enhance tax revenues
and prevent the unauthorized holding of foreign assets remains open to debate, the political case
for the policy may be even more tenuous.
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8.

Capital flight as anti-development
The world’s most unequal country

The 13 May 2019 issue of Time magazine featured an eye-catching cover of an aerial photograph
from Johannesburg that captured the stark inequality in South Africa. On one side of the photo is
the upscale neighborhood of Primrose, and on the other, separated by a high wall, is the informal
settlement of Makause (Photograph 2). The contrast is remarkable, but by no means unique in
South Africa. A similar image could juxtapose the wealthy Bloubosrand and the township of Kya
Sands in Johannesburg, or the Cape Town communities of Strand and Somerset West and the
Nomzamo/Lwandle townships.
The physical separation between rich and poor in South Africa a legacy of apartheid. There are
many other African cities where poverty and wealth coexist side-by-side. In Addis Ababa, the of
Ethiopia, for example, the mansions of the rich and the shanty homes of the poor co-mingle in the
same neighborhoods. Every morning, some residents open their eyes to see wealth they cannot
even dream of, while others see abject poverty that they wish could be moved away for it depressed
the value of their real estate. Today, poor households are being displaced into undeveloped
settlements miles away from the city. It seems that one response to poverty and inequality is to
hide the poor far from the gaze of others, saving the elite from the shame of witnessing poverty
every day.
Photograph 2

Source: Time, May 13, 2019 (Pomerantz, 2019).
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The 2018 report, Overcoming Poverty and Inequality in South Africa, by the World Bank, the
UNDP, Statistics South Africa, and the government’s Department of Planning, Monitoring and
Evaluation, portrays South Africa as one of the most unequal country in the world, based on
conventional measures of inequality (World Bank et al., 2018). Income inequality as measured by
the Gini coefficient is far higher in South Africa than the world average (see Figure 29). Moreover,
inequality today is even higher than it was under apartheid.

Figure 29: Inequality in South Africa compared to the world average (Gini coefficient)
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It is estimated that in 2015, the richest one percent of South Africans received 19% of national
income, almost double their share at the end of the apartheid era (Figure 30). Alongside income
inequality, South Africa also exhibits high levels of asset inequality, which not only contributes to
income inequality but also acts as a serious constraint on social mobility. Key elements of the
country’s asset inequality include unequal access to fertile agricultural land and unequal ownership
of physical and financial capital, which remain concentrated in the hands of the white minority, a
legacy of apartheid. The strategies adopted by the post-apartheid democratic governments to
alleviate these inequalities to date have yielded limited results. These include the Black Economic
Empowerment (BEE) program, which has been criticized as worsening intra-racial inequality by
merely helping to grow the black economic elite.
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Figure 30: Fiscal income in South Africa: share of the top 1%
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The implications of capital flight for poverty and inequality in South Africa
South Africa has among the highest levels of inequality among middle-income countries. The
country is characterized by a wide rural-urban divide. About 65 percent of the rural population
lives below the poverty line, compared to 25% for the urban population. Poverty is much higher
among non-whites and among female-headed households.
In 2015, 65 percent of the South African rural population lived below the national poverty line.
This was an improvement, for in 2006 the poverty rate was at 75% (World Bank et al., 2018, p.
xix). The overall poverty headcount declined from 51% to 40% during the same period. The
reduction in poverty in recent years is partly due to an expansion in government redistribution and
family support programs, including social grants, which have helped recipients to better afford
basic needs such as food, shelter, and health services. However, the beneficiaries of these programs
remain highly vulnerable to falling back into poverty, since they are one grant check away from
deprivation.
A key factor in poverty and inequality in South Africa, as in other countries, is access to decent
employment and a living wage. Lack of access to educational opportunities compromises social
mobility and contributes to perpetuating intergenerational poverty and inequality. The 2018 report
on inequality and poverty put it as follows: ‘The inequality of opportunity in education is
particularly influential in the transition to tertiary education, where despite a high return, access to
higher education remains limited. The influence of education on inequality raises concerns
77

regarding low-income families that lack easy access to credit markets and incur relatively high
costs of sending a child to college. This serves as a major barrier to getting sufficient levels of
education to participate actively in the semi-skilled and skilled labor market’ (World Bank et al.,
2018, p. xviii). Combatting multidimensional poverty and structural inequality will require policies
that improve access to education and employment opportunities for the historically disadvantaged
populations.
South Africa already has highly unequal health and education systems, where a small proportion
of the population is able to access well-funded private systems, while the large majority rely on
the public provision of these basic services. The inability of the state to maintain and improve
public health and education systems will only serve to exacerbate existing inequalities. The Budget
Justice Coalition (2019) points out that the reduction in the number of state employees over the
recent years has been motivated solely by the desire to reduce costs, without addressing issues of
operational efficiency and state capacity. By encouraging senior civil servants to take up generous
early retirement packages, much institutional knowledge and capacity is being lost. This has
particularly impacted provincial governments, where critical departments such as health and
education are understaffed.
Critical health care posts today remain unfulfilled. The deteriorating healthcare system has a
detrimental impact on people’s lives, and the country has seen a large increase in medico-legal
claims against the state, rising from R28.6 billion in March 2015 to R80.4 billion in March 2018.
For some provinces, the costs of addressing these claims now makes up a substantial part of their
annual healthcare budget (Budget Justice Coalition, 2019).
In basic education, spending per learner has remained at 2011/2012 levels after adjustment for
inflation, with major quality shortfalls (Budget Justice Coalition, 2019). Learning outcomes of
pupils in basic education do not meet basic standards, with South African students performing very
poorly on international benchmarking tests. In addition, many schools do not meet basic standards
for infrastructure: 2,400 schools still have unsafe pit latrines; 18,019 have no library; 16,897 have
no internet connectivity; 9,956 have no sports facilities; 1,027 have no perimeter fencing; and 269
have no electricity (Budget Justice Coalition, 2019). A budget review by UNICEF (2019) echoes
these concerns and indicates that the rates of growth in expenditures on basic education
infrastructure, HIV/AIDS life skills, and Math, Science and Technology are expected to decline
over the medium term.
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Policy makers should be concerned about capital flight in any country, but the problem deserves
even more serious attention in a country with high poverty and deep inequality. Capital flight
contributes to worsening inequality in multiple ways. The smuggling of capital out of the country
and the concealment of wealth offshore enable the wealth holders to evade taxation, further
widening their income and asset advantages relative to the rest of the population. Capital flight
also exacerbates inequality because the wealth accumulated abroad is shielded from the negative
effects of exchange rate shocks.
Because the wealth that is hidden offshore and income generated by it are not counted in official
statistics, the existing measures of inequality substantially underestimate the true levels of
disparities. More accurate measures would further entrench South Africa’s unenviable position as
one of the most unequal countries in the world.
At the same time, capital flight reduces the government’s capacity to implement redistributive
fiscal policy by draining the tax base. Empirical analysis tends to show that fiscal policy in South
Africa in general has been highly redistributive, combining a relatively progressive taxation system
and targeted government spending on social services (see, among others, Inchauste et al. (2015),
Leibbrandt et al. (2010), and van der Berg (2009)). Inchauste et al. (2015, p. 29) find that targeted
fiscal policy leads to reduction in the Gini coefficient for income (after taxes and social
expenditures) from 0.77 to 0.60 and reduces extreme poverty (defined as an income of $1.25 PPP
per day) from 34.% to 16.5%. Indeed, the available evidence indicates that redistributive efforts of
fiscal policy are relatively higher in South Africa than in comparable middle income countries
(Inchauste et al., 2015; Lustig, 2016). Inchauste et al. (2015, p. 2) suggest that without these
progressive strategies, two-fifths of the population would have witnessed declining incomes during
the first 10 years of the democratic era.
The fact that despite these achievements South Africa’s poverty rate remains high, and that the
country remains one of the most unequal countries in the world, suggests a need for scaling up
social spending programs and fine-tuning targeting. The government’s capacity to undertake a
more effective anti-poverty agenda is compromised, however, by capital flight which erodes its
resource base and hence undermines its spending capacity.
By draining domestic savings, capital flight erodes investable capital and slows capital
accumulation in the source country (Fofack and Ndikumana, 2010; Ndikumana and Boyce, 2013).
As noted earlier, South Africa has endured a secular decline in domestic investment that started at
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the beginning of the 1980s. The acceleration of capital flight in the post-apartheid era makes it
harder for the country to reverse this trend, perpetuating a lower steady state level of domestic
investment.
The slowdown in capital accumulation retards growth, and all else equal, slower growth translates
into slower poverty reduction over time. If all the capital that fled the country had been invested
domestically and had generated the same rates of return as the historical rates earned by domestic
capital, South Africa would have been able to reach and even exceed the MDG1 target of halving
poverty by 2015 (Nkurunziza, 2015). The negative effects of slow growth on poverty reduction
are exacerbated, of course, by the negative effects of high inequality. More inequality is associated
with a lower growth-poverty elasticity, meaning that higher growth rates are required to generate
meaningful poverty reduction.
Insofar as capital flight is funded by the embezzlement of funds borrowed by the public sector (or
guaranteed by the public sector) and the theft of state assets, it constitutes a direct drain on
government resources, reducing the state’s capacity to finance public investment and services such
as education and health. Given that the poor segments of the population are more dependent on
public social services than the rich, the reduction in the supply and quality of public services
increases deprivation and further widens inequality.86
Capital flight from a country with high poverty and inequality may pose a serious challenge for
political stability as well as economic development. For South Africa’s non-white majority, the
end of the apartheid regime was expected to bring dividends in the form of both political
emancipation and improved economic well-being. Persistent inequality alienates the majority who
remain bypassed by prosperity in a land that boasts of being the richest country on the continent.
Inequality together with oppression galvanized the struggle against the apartheid regime. Going
forward, inequality may stimulate new demands for social change that the government may not be
able to contain. The signs of resistance to inequality are clearly emerging in South Africa, as
illustrated, for example, by the resistance against financial barriers to higher education as well as
the rising trend in the number of strikes by South Africa’s working class. From 2009 to 2018, the
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This can be seen in the 2019 National Budget, where there was a R50.5 billion reduction in baseline spending
Review (National Treasury, 2019). This is offset by an allocation of R75.3 billion over the next three years, almost
entirely for the reconfiguration of Eskom – one of the core institutions involved in the State Capture saga. In this
regard, in a five-year budget review submitted to the Parliament by a range of civil society organizations that form
the Budget Justice Coalition (Budget Justice Coalition, 2019), important concerns about the cuts to social spending
are raised.
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number of strikes and lockouts in all sectors rose from 51 to 165 per annum (ILO Statistical
database, 2020). Inequality needs to be taken seriously through policies and programs that address
the concerns of the ordinary citizen, instead of focusing on redistributing wealth among those who
are already in higher strata of society, such as has often occurred under BEE initiatives. To finance
these programs, the government must mobilize adequate resources, and one of the ways to do so
is to curb the financial hemorrhage that is capital fight.
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9.

Conclusion

South Africa faces a range of daunting development challenges, with stubborn multidimensional
poverty and high unemployment. Its government is confronted with chronic financing deficits that
make it difficult to undertake the necessary investments to meet the needs of the population for
public infrastructure and social services such as education, health, and decent housing. These
challenges are exacerbated by capital flight that depletes investable capital and erodes the tax base.
From 1970 to 2017, we estimate that South Africa lost over $300 billion from capital flight.
A key channel for this was the overinvoicing of imports and the underinvoicing of exports. Net
trade misinvoicing contributed to $146 billion in capital flight over the 1998-2017 period alone.
Export underinvoicing appears to be especially rampant in the case of mineral resources, such as
gold, silver, platinum and diamonds. An important step in combating capital flight is to tackle
trade-based outflows by implementing rigorous, symmetrical, and transparent reporting of trade
statistics, starting with big-ticket items such as mineral exports. At the very least, it would be a
significant improvement to establish reliability and consistency across data published by various
government agencies, and between South African government agencies and the international
institutions to which it supplies trade data. Even better would be international cooperation to ensure
symmetrical reporting between South Africa’s own data and that of its trading partners. A key to
achieving this is to systematically apply international conventions on reporting of trade statistics
to which South Africa already is a signatory.
Capital flight has resulted in the accumulation of massive private wealth hidden abroad. This
constitutes a loss to the country in terms of drainage of investable capital and shrinking of the tax
base. The accumulation of private offshore wealth exacerbates poverty and income and asset
inequality, making this a serious development problem.
Since the apartheid era, successive South African governments have tried to implement policies to
tackle the problem of capital flight and encourage domestic investment. The analysis presented in
this paper suggests that these policies have not had much effect in reigning in capital flight or
enticing repatriation of offshore wealth. The rigid capital controls under the apartheid era proved
ineffective, mainly because they were implemented at a time where the country was facing deep
political instability and an international economic embargo. Since the government turned to market
liberalization starting in the 1990s, the results have not been significantly better. Indeed, capital
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flight accelerated during the very same period when the government ramped up market-based
reforms. The government adopted direct measures to entice offshore wealth repatriation and
increase tax compliance through various amnesties. The gains from these programs remain largely
unknown because of the lack of adequate data.
In designing policies to reduce capital flight and induce offshore wealth repatriation, it is important
to distinguish between legal capital outflows and honestly acquired offshore wealth on the one
hand, and illicit transfers and illegally acquired wealth on the other hand. Reforms that raise the
domestic rates of returns to investment and reduce market uncertainty are not likely to affect
decisions regarding wealth that was illicitly acquired, transferred and held abroad. For this form
of wealth, the asset holders are less interested in high rates of returns to investment than they are
in the protection that secrecy jurisdictions provide against legal prosecution. What is needed
instead are effective strategies to strengthen domestic legal systems and international cooperation,
to increase financial transparency and enhance the exchange of information on illicit cross-border
financial flows and trade misinvoicing.
A key challenge faced by South Africa in its quest to combat capital flight and the associated
problems of tax evasion, profit shifting, and money laundering is the erosion of public confidence
in state institutions associated with the phenomenon of state capture. Recent reports have unveiled
a deeply troubling pattern of corrosive collusion between state actors and a network of enablers
who orchestrated the plunder of state resources to accumulate private wealth. These networks
include powerful and politically well-connected individuals and families, domestic and foreign
banks, law and auditing firms, consulting firms and others with deep connections with the
government and the private sector in South Africa and around the world. In this paper, we used
the case of the Gupta family to illustrate the role of these networks in state capture and money
laundering. Lamentably, and as astounding as this may seem, it is likely that the case of the Gupta
family is only the tip of the iceberg, exposing much deeper problems faced by state institutions in
South Africa today. Such an environment is fertile ground for capital flight and other forms of
illicit financial flows.
The severe adverse effects of capital flight and offshore wealth accumulation on economic
development, institutional quality and governance call for decisive action to prevent potentially
more devastating consequences in terms of political and social instability. In sum, capital flight is
an issue that needs to be tackled urgently.
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